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ETHICS AND PERSUASION: KIERKEGAARD'S EXISTENTIAL DIALECTIC
Ralph McInerny

ESSENCE AND SUPPOSIT IN THE ANGELS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS
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Notes and Discussion, Book Reviews

Saint Louis University

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Ralph McInerny

ETHICS AND PERSUASION: KIERKEGAARD'S EXISTENTIAL DIALECTIC

Mr. Ralph McInerny *is a member of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame. He received his M. A. from the University of Minnesota and his Ph. D. from Laval University. He has previously taught at Creighton University. He has written articles for* America *and* Laval theologique et philosophique. *He sent a communication to the Fourth International Thomistic Congress, which is published in* Sapientia Aquinatis.

It may perhaps seem curious that a thinker who spent his life insisting on the unalterable opposition between knowledge and virtue should qualify himself as another Socrates; yet this is but one facet of the continuing enigma of Kierkegaard. Undeniably there have been many and varied critiques of the Danish thinker which have cast most aspects of his writing in perspective; however, there seems to be a general reluctance to assess the central thread of his literature: the mode of presentation, which is called, variously, indirect communication and the existential dialectic.[1] We will not be guilty, then, of needless repetition if we devote ourselves to an appreciation of Kierkegaard's somewhat peculiar manner of expressing his thought. Our trajectory will be this: First, we will endeavor to show that indirect communication is central to an understanding of Kierkegaard; secondly, a presentation of indirect communication as a theory will be essayed, after which an indication of how it was concretely realized will be in order; finally, we will turn to what is, after all, the most important part of any philosophical paper, a judgment or evaluation of what has been presented.

I. The Author of the Authors

At least in one respect the writings of Kierkegaard have seemingly

lost their difficulty in translation. Each of them is attributed to Kierkegaard as such, and the general reader can quite easily overlook the fact (alluded to on a flyleaf) that it was not thus that they first appeared. The coterie of pseudonymous authors which Kierkegaard created is sometimes dismissed as a marginal quirk, an insignificant trifle which, once mentioned, can be conveniently forgotten. That this inevitably leads to the attribution of radically conflicting views to the Dane is apparently overlooked. But could we seriously believe that one man would present the "Diary of the Seducer" and *The Works of Love* unqualifiedly as his proper thought? We will assume that the guise of pseudonymity is important and that only what appeared under his own name can be attributed unreservedly to Kierkegaard. For the pseudonyms are integral parts of indirect communication, and

> when an author has an individual conception of what communication is, when perhaps the distinctive characteristic, the reality of his historical importance is concentrated in precisely this; well, then it will be a long affair—O school of patience. Before there can be any notion of understanding anything which he has communicated one must first of all understand him from the point of view of his particular dialectic of communication, and understand everything from that point of view.[3]

In Kierkegaard's own mind, then, his mode of communication is the key to what he had to say; any impatience we might feel with it would not seem to justify minimizing its importance. "Indirect communica-

[1]The article of Robert Cumming's, "Existence and Communication" in *Ethics*, LXV (January, 1955), 79-101, is a welcome exception.

[2]*The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard*, ed. Alexander Dru (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), p. 226, n. 722.

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 347-48, n. 1000.

[4]*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), p. 552.

[5]*ST*, I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 5. Kierkegaard's statement, "God does not exist, He is eternal" (*Postscript*, p. 296) is one of many indications of the distinction he wants to draw. He allows for a "loose sense of so-called existence" (*ibid.*, p. 276), which corresponds with the *esse simpliciter* of St. Thomas. The wrangle over the existentialist contention that existence precedes essence is susceptible of a perfectly justifiable interpretation. We first are and then become what we should be, or, if you will, we are first perfected by the good which is convertible with being, and only later by the good which divides being; that is, moral goodness.

[6]*Phaedo* 96; *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), I, 481. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A. 987bl-4: "Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters . . ." (Ross's translation).

tion was my natural qualification,"[3] he felt, and it is the first and abiding difficulty in understanding what he had to say.

The pseudonyms are the *dramatis personae* of the Kierkegaardian literature; they are the masks through which Kierkegaard speaks indirectly to us, and it is extremely difficult to get through to the man behind the masks. But it will not do to deny the masks and rush barefoot through the literature as if it were a univocal presentation of Kierkegaard's own thought. He is the "author of the authors,"[4] always once removed from our grasp, presenting us with a dialogue which has as its constant subject what it means to exist as a man.

II. Ethics and Existence

It is now generally recognized that the import of existentialism is an ethical one, that the "existence" of which Kierkegaard especially speaks is not so much a question of being, as of being as one ought to be, the *esse secundum quid* of St. Thomas.[5] Kierkegaard's first resemblance to Socrates is certainly here; the latter, we remember, was not interested in physics, but in man.[6] So Kierkegaard is interested in what it means to be a man and, ultimately, what it means to be a Christian. This is not being *tout court* but a qualification of existence in terms of an end or goal. A second similarity with Socrates is in the mode of communication, the dialogue concerning existence, which is also a partial explanation of the bevy of pseudonymous authors. The pseudonyms are meant to represent the cognitive apparatus involved in a view of existence, of human existence. Hence the famous delineation of "existence spheres."

In order to understand why Kierkegaard had recourse to pseudonymity we must first of all examine his opinion about the relation of knowledge to existence or doing, for the notion of indirect communication was felt to follow necessarily on the nature of this relation. Johannes Climacus, the author who represents most closely Kierkegaard's own thought, has this to say:

> For it is regarded as a settled thing, that the objective tendency in direction of intellectual contemplation, is, in the newer linguistic usage, the *ethical* answer to the question of what I ethically

> have to do . . . The objective tendency is the way and the truth; the ethical is, becoming an observer! That the individual must become an observer is the *ethical* answer to the problem of life—or else one is compelled to assume that there is no ethical problem at all, and in so far no ethical answer.[7]

The complaint is directed against Hegelianism and the supposed identity of thought and being. Being is taken by Kierkegaard to mean action, human existence thought of in terms of *agibilia*. "How is it then with the supposed identity of thought and being in connection with the kind of existence that belongs to particular human beings? Am I the good because I think the good, or am I good because I think the good?"[8] At the very foundation of what Kierkegaard has to say is this opposition between thought and action. "If the content of thought were reality, the most perfect possible anticipation of an action in thought before I had yet acted, would be the action."[9] The question for Johannes thus becomes, What is the relation between thought and action if it is not one of identity?

He approaches the question by assigning to thought the sphere of the possible, the disinterested and objective, and to action the sphere of the subjective. There is, however, a "twilight zone" between these two extremes when thought begins to become disturbed by its proximity to action.[10] Thought never, it must be remembered, becomes identified with action; the transition is not gradual but must be effected by a leap.[11] The characterization of thought as possibility explains the description of the ethical task as the resolution of a *posse* into an *esse*.[12] Actions are simply the doing of what has been thought. Kierkegaard has been called an anti-intellectual;[13] and we will see that there is justification for this charge, but certainly in this matter he is on the side of the angels. Far from discriminating against intellect

[7] *Postscript*, p. 119. Kierkegaard's name appeared on the title page of this work as the one responsible for publication.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] The "leap" is an act of the will, as will be made clear below.

[12] *Postscript*, p. 288.

[13] Cf. David F. Swenson, *Something about Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1948), pp. 135-58.

[14] *Postscript*, p. 175.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 177. This quotation would seem to suggest a certain caution to those who would proceed from a discussion of existentialism to the characterization of a metaphysics as existential. If we want to make use of the term "existential" in a way that will be meaningful to moderns, the analogy should be based on the role of the good or final cause.

[17] *Ibid.*

in an area where it has undisputed precedence, he is noting that in action, thinking is not the whole story.

The "twilight zone" is elaborated on in terms of "subjective reflection," which turns its attention inward to the subject and "desires in this intensification of inwardness to realize the truth."[14]

> This reflection of inwardness gives to the subjective thinker a double reflection. In thinking, he thinks the universal; not as existing in this thought, but as assimilating it in his inwardness, he becomes more and more subjectively isolated.[15]

So much is clear when it is question of the individual concerned only with himself; his task is not merely to think the good but to become it, to exist in it. Something else comes to the fore as a result of this consideration, the notion of what is essential knowledge and what is not. Essential knowledge is existential knowledge.

> All essential knowledge relates to existence, or only such knowledge as has an essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge. All knowledge which does not inwardly relate itself to existence, in the reflection of inwardness, is, essentially viewed, accidental knowledge.[16]

This passage indicates the fundamentally practical orientation of Kierkegaard's thought, as well as his anti-intellectualism, for by such a criterion all speculative thought is nonessential or accidental. We are left in no doubt of this: "Only ethical and ethico-religious knowledge has an essential relationship to the existence of the knower."[17] That which has no effect on human action is insignificant; all knowledge, to have importance, must be ordered to doing.

III. Existential Communication

All of this is going to have a great deal of bearing on any attempt to influence others; these are the thoughts which dictated the concept of indirect communication. Direct communication presents no problem for Kierkegaard; the teacher-pupil relationship is established, and the truth is stated as directly as possible. But when that which is to be communicated does not fall under any objective discipline, when, on the contrary, it is related to subjectivity, then direct communication would be a tragic blunder.

> If communicated in the form of knowledge, the recipient is led to adopt the misunderstanding that it is knowledge he is to receive, and then we are again in the sphere of knowledge.[18]

This is the continuing dilemma in the ethical order, Kierkegaard believes; thought which is ordered to action is communicated in the same way as objective truth. Ethics is communicated as if it were geometry.

Are we to conclude that Kierkegaard feels that there is no possibility of classroom training in general ethical notions? Probably not. There are times when even truths which are ordered to action demand direct communication. Indeed, indirect communication presupposes the knowledge of what is being communicated; it has to do with the existential assimilation of what may be presumed to be known.[19] Kierkegaard is not interested in adding to the fund of objective knowledge; his avowed object is to stir men to action, to the realization of truths already known. Unless this is kept in mind, indirect communication loses every bit of its meaning and must appear only as a queer and unnecessary masking of what might better have been directly and openly said.

Recall that the relation of thought to action was explained in terms of "subjective reflection," a kind of reduplication of thought wherein the universal is applied subjectively to the existing thinker. There is something similar to this in the communication of an existential message.

> . . . just as the subjective existing thinker has made himself free through the reduplication given his reflection, so the secret of all communication consists precisely in emancipating the recipient, and that for this reason he must not communicate himself directly; aye, that it is even irreligious to do so.[20]

Existential knowledge, we are told, does not permit of direct com-

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[21] "That is to say, the subjective thinker will from the beginning have his attention called to the requirement that this form should embody artistically as much reflection as he himself has when existing in his thought. In an artistic manner, please note; for the secret does not lie in a direct assertion of the double reflection; such a direct expression of it is precisely a contradiction" (*ibid.*, pp. 68-69; see as well p. 73).

[22] *The Point of View*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford Univ. Press, 1950), p. 23.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

munication because its essential feature is that it must be appropriated existentially, not merely understood.[21] Thus Kierkegaard's views on the nature of human action suggest his mode of communication. He would influence his fellows, but in order to do so he must be elusive and artistic; he cannot pontificate and tell them directly what they are to do. Their response might very well be the assertion that they understand him perfectly, while they remain unaltered existentially. Kierkegaard, despite his damning of speculation, evolved a theory of persuasion and applied it concretely. The goal sought is the assent of existential choice; the either/or he presents to a man does not consist of propositions to be embraced intellectually but of actions to be accomplished. What is his method?

Kierkegaard was a missionary, a zealot; he wanted to bring Christianity back to Christendom.[22] The problem was not, so he thought, that men had not received the good news; they were simply not Christians. He could add nothing to their *knowledge* of Christianity, but he thought that he had happened on a way to make them realize their obligations. An ambitious enterprise, his, and no one was more aware of the possible pitfalls. These men who called themselves Christians were living in categories which Kierkegaard termed "aesthetic, or at the most, in aesthetic-ethical categories."[23] He could not approach them saying

> I am a Christian; you are not a Christian. Nor does one begin thus: It is Christianity I am proclaiming; and you are living in purely aesthetic categories. No, one begins thus: Let us talk about aesthetics.[24]

This is the indirect method, which is dialectical and deceiving,

> which loving and serving the truth, arranges everything dialectically for the prospective captive and then shyly withdraws (for love is always shy), so as not to witness the admission which he makes to himself alone before God—that he has lived hitherto in an illusion.[25]

The indirect method prepares the way for a choice; it cannot, of course, insure that the desired choice will follow—the only certainty is that the message will be seen for what it is. In order to become

skilled in this indirect method, Kierkegaard had to engage in "daily practise of the scales, or patient finger-exercises in the dialectical."[26] He must win the ears of men; and in order to do this, he must deceive them. This points up a further similarity with Socrates.

> One can deceive a person for the truth's sake, and (to recall old Socrates) one can deceive a person into the truth. Indeed, it is only by this means, i.e., by deceiving them, that it is possible to bring into the truth one who is in an illusion.[27]

It is not insignificant that Kierkegaard refers to indirect communication as an art, but it is a rather involved art. The one communicating must not introduce himself into his communication; he is to remain completely objective while "composing qualitative opposites into unity."[28] He will be alternately playful and in earnest, creating such a dialectical knot that one must untie it for himself if he is to profit by it. Here is the difficulty in interpreting Kierkegaard. It is fairly easy to reconstruct the theory of indirect communication; it is quite another matter to follow it *in concreto*. The maieutic method, as he termed it, can become somewhat abortive, for it presupposes an interest which the reader may very likely not have. The knots are often tied so well that one is willing to leave them and go on to more profitable pursuits. Kierkegaard has foreseen this objection.

> What else should anyone have who proposes to set forth the ethical? Should he perhaps seek to frame it objectively in formal paragraph structure, fit to be learned and recited by rote, so as to contradict himself by his form? In my opinion, pathos and

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[28] *Training in Christianity*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford, 1941), p. 132.

[29] *Postscript*, p. 137.

[30] *Point of View*, p. 146.

[31] *Postscript*, p. 226. The fact that the choice of oneself begins the ethical and gives good and evil meaning is also the beginning of the *existential*, corroborates our contention that existentialism is concerned with moral being. "There are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the ethical and religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, there is no man who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical, ontology *is* but does not *exist;* for when it exists it is in the aesthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when it *is* it is the abstraction of or the *prius* for the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious" (*Stages on Life's Way*, trans. Walter Lowrie [Princeton, 1945], p. 430). The remarks made above in note 5 should save the Thomist from apoplexy in reading this. It is Kierkegaard's custom to lump speculation and aesthetics together because, he would say, neither "wins through to existence." A discussion of this identification may be seen in our "A Note on the Kierkegaardian Either/Or" in *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, VIII (1952), 230-42.

> irony and dialectic are *quod desideratur* when the ethical is *quod erat demonstrandum.*[29]

In this is roughly what is meant by indirect communication; and if the Kierkegaardian literature is meant to be an example of it, we must certainly be wary of treating the individual works as if they were direct presentations of objective data. These works embody a many-sided thought precisely because they are meant to represent a variety of attitudes towards human existence. But there is method behind the diversity.

> The movement described by the authorship is this: *from* the poet (from aesthetics), *from* philosophy (from speculation), *to* the indication of the most central definition of what Christianity is.[30]

The problem for the student of Kierkegaard is to trace the dialectic which relates one work to another, parts of the same work to one another. It is a tedious task and we have no a-priori certitude that it will be a worthwhile trip; it will be agreed, however, that if this is what Kierkegaard intended, it would be folly to ignore the mode and teleology of his literature.

IV. Communicating Indirectly

The first dialectical clash is had between what are called the aesthetic and ethical spheres. This is the content of *Either/Or.* The first "existence sphere," paradoxically enough, is not existential; it does not win through to existence.[31] It is a poetic existence, but the notion of poetry does not exhaust the import of the term "aesthetic." Each of the stages is more analogically than univocally one, and the aesthetic is meant to comprise a life of sensuality as one term and a highly developed poetic attitude towards life as the other. The motto of the first volume of *Either/Or* is, "Are passions then the pagans of the soul, reason alone baptized?" The volume represents a subtle and consistent approach to the role of the passions in human life. We are first presented with various diapsalamata which convey the sudden passionate crescendos and decrescendos of the life based merely on feeling. We are given, in an analysis of Mozart's *Don Giovanni,* a

discussion of passion utterly divorced from reason, a law unto itself. The various essays, the work of the "young man" who has not yet embraced the aesthetic life, explore the place of love in human life, the role of the passions. There is a great deal of cynicism, a great deal of immaturity, presented in an expert artistic manner which never forces the issue. What Kierkegaard means by the aesthetic sphere is created before our eyes. But the diabolical aspect of this sphere comes only at the culmination of the volume when the "Dairy of the Seducer" is transcribed by the young man. Here, seduction as the keynote of the aesthetic sphere is developed somewhat melodramatically but nevertheless effectively. The further possibilities of the aesthetic sphere are developed in the banquet scene of *Stages on Life's Way*,[32] where the infinite variety of this nonexistential mode of existence is hinted at. The second volume of *Either/Or* consists of several letters to the young man written by Judge Wilhelm, the representative of the ethical. The judge is called upon again in the *Stages*. He is not an altogether attractive character and his letters are verbose and sometimes severe; Kierkegaard seems intent on depriving the ethical of any aesthetic allure, although the judge insists that he has not foregone pleasure so much as oriented it. His solution to the impasse of the aesthetic is the notion of choice. Precisely what is to be chosen is hidden beneath some rather Hegelian verbiage, but the notion of choice of oneself emerges. This is not to be taken as a choice between good and evil; rather, choice is that whereby good and evil acquire meaning. The idea seems to be that prior to entering upon ethical activity, good and evil have no meaning. The aesthetic continues to represent passions as divorced more or less completely from the human composite.

Our purpose is not to delineate the oppositions of these two spheres but rather to discover the method of communication which they were intended to represent. Analyses of the cognitive contents of the spheres are quite easily come by. The most obvious instance of indirect communication involved in *Either/Or* is in the pitting of one alternative against the other. The reader is to see the aesthetic through the eyes

[32]The genuine literary merit of Kierkegaard is most easily seen in this dialogue which owes not a little to Plato's *Symposium*.

[33]*Point of View*, pp. 10-14 and passim.

[34]Johannes Climacus' remarks on the suspension can be found in the *Postscript*, pp. 234-38.

of aesthetes and note the ethical judgment on it. There is no explicit indication of which position is more worthy of choice. And yet the very title of the work would seem to indicate that a choice is in order. That Kierkegaard thought the ethical preferable is never allowed to intrude itself into this work. The reader was to be drawn into the discussion, have his passional nature involved in the stakes, so that a subsequent choice would be existentially meaningful. The choice, be it noted, is not contained between the covers of the work. Kierkegaard intends these pseudonymous authors to present a given outlook on life with all its logical consequences; he then withdraws so that one can make his choice in private.

We have, then, a recognizable use of indirect communication in this first work of Kierkegaard. We have a dialogue concerning existence, despite the fact that only one of the alternatives is deemed to be existential. The further movement of the literature is in the direction of the religious and, ultimately, of Christianity. Not that the end was not present from the beginning. In the *Point of View*, Kierkegaard explains the function of the *Edifying Discourses* in the existential dialectic. These latter were planned to appear concomitantly with each pseudonymous work, under Kierkegaard's own name, to indicate the radically religious nature of his whole output.[33] The movement from the aesthetic to the ethical is accomplished, in the literature, rather quickly; but the further step into the religious was a longer and more cautious one. Note, too, that the only transition from one sphere to another is by a leap; that is, by a choice, an act of the will. Only in this way could the transition be existential; again, this is not an argument but a phenomenology of human action with persuasion as its end.

Fully to explain the description of the inadequacy of the ethical as it is shown in *Repetition, Fear and Trembling*, and "Quidam's Diary" would unduly lengthen this paper. The breakdown of the ethical, briefly, is shown in a series of existential situations in which the general rule does not hold—the famous teleological suspension of the ethical absolute.[34] That the suspension is teleological must never be overlooked. One foresakes the general rule because it is taken to be a temptation away from a greater good. However, one is held equally

to the pursuit of both goods; and the inner stress and anguish, the speculative absurdity resulting from the recognition of two conflicting obligations, is what Kierkegaard understood to be faith. Faith is of the absurd. It is necessary to believe because understanding is impossible; indeed, the verdict of the human understanding on truths of faith is that they are contradictory and absurd. This, again, is not presented as an argument. We see individuals writhing in the anguish of conflicting duties, drawn against their understanding to the absurd. The idea of passion returns as we travel up the existential ladder, and Christianity is thought to be the most passionate existence. Doubtless, "passion" is analogical for Kierkegaard, but there is the further notion that Christianity completes man as a whole. The disordered passions of the aesthetic sphere become existential in the ethical sphere; and it, in its turn, is subsumed under the religious. The lower spheres are not destroyed; they are thought to telescope into the higher in a way analogous to the intellectual soul's containing virtually the lower species of souls. Kierkegaard was constantly on guard against the interpretation of Christianity as a flight from life; it must be in the world but not of it. This led him to an absurd criticism of the monastic ideal,[35] against which he pits the fearful and inhuman ideal of the "religion of hidden inwardness."[36] Despite his insistence on the integrating effect of religious existence, it is possible to trace a line in the literature which denies any recognizable place for the passions in the Christian life. Critics of Kierkegaard might find it to their advantage to examine this apparent contradiction in his thought. The literature which was tailored to the notion of what it means to exist as a man seems to end, in the *Postscript* at least, in an ideal which is inhuman as well as unorthodox.

V. St. Thomas and Kierkegaard

The disciple of St. Thomas cannot rest in the simple presentation of the thought of Kierkegaard; he must go on to juxtapose the thought of his master, and, *mutatis mutandis*, see wherein the two agree and

[35]Cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), p. 145, n. 61.

[36]*Postscript*, pp. 468-93.

[37]A.-D. Sertillanges, *The Intellectual Life*, trans. Mary Ryan (Westminster Press, 1948), p. 120.

[38]*De Virt. in Com.*, a. 6, ad 1; *In II Ethic.*, lect. 2 and 4.

[39]*In III de Anima*, lect. 16; *In II Ethic.*, lect. 8.

[40]*De Malo*, q. 3, a. 6.

wherein they differ. Following the maxim of Sertillanges, he will place the emphasis on the agreements.

> Especially in regard of very great minds, it is a sort of profanation to adopt a fault-finding attitude. Let us regret their errors, but without violent condemnation; let us build bridges, not dig ditches between their doctrines. There is a great revelation in discovering the hidden links that exist between ideas and systems the most dissimilar.[37]

Surely this is the *élan vital* of the perennial philosophy.

Kierkegaard saw the need for indirect communication arise out of the relationship between thought and action, knowledge and virtue. Objective thought, he has said, has no relation to existence. Were we to take "existence" here for something other than the positing of human acts, we would get into a discussion which would have little to do with what Kierkegaard is saying. Speculative science, which answers to the notion of objective thought, does indeed ignore existence, in the sense that it is not ordered to doing or making. This seems to be all Kierkegaard intends. The subjective, on the other hand, is *extra limites intellectus*. Where, then, is practical thought? Recall the notion of the twilight zone where thought becomes less objective due to its proximity to action. This would seem to answer to our notion of practical science. Before discussing indirect communication as such, let us examine somewhat determinately the ideas in question.

What is the value of ethics when it is question of this particular action? Is action made easier in virtue of knowledge? With St. Thomas we must say that no amount of practical science, be it as detailed as one could wish, can tell us what to do here and now; nor can the knowledge of moral science insure that good actions will follow.[38] Why is this? Precepts are stated as universals, and the universal cannot move the will because actions are singular.[39] It is because of this that we have two sciences which have to do with our actions. The first is the universal science already mentioned. As a remote guide for action such science is useful; without it we would commit many errors which, because of it, we avoid. Secondly, there is a particular science which looks to the circumstances of this particular action.[40] In dealing with the singular, the intellect, which has no direct knowledge of

singulars, must rely in a special way on the lower potencies of the soul and especially on the particular reason.[41]

This inability of our intellect to achieve an exhaustive knowledge of the singular circumstances of actions is the first source of our possible defection from the good. We can attain without error to knowledge of the good in general, but the judgment as to this particular thing's relation to the good is something about which we can easily err.[42] Knowledge could be virtue only if we had, naturally and immutably, exhaustive knowledge of the universal and perfect good, something only God has.[43] A second source of our possible defection from the good is something extrinsic to reason,

> when, because of the intensity of the movement of the lower powers, the judgment of reason is affected in such a way that its judgment of the good cannot be proposed firmly and clearly to the will. Someone having a rectified intention of preserving chastity, for example, may choose the contrary of chastity out of desire for delectation because the judgment is in some way dissolved by concupiscence.[44]

[41]"Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari: et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis. Unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur quae dicitur *ratio particularis*, sive *vis cogitativa*, quae est collativa intentionum particularium" (*In VI Ethic.*, lect. 1).

[42]*De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 8.

[43]"Unde et natura rationabilis, quae ordinata est ad bonum absolute per actiones multifarias, non potest habere naturaliter actiones indeficientes a bono, nisi ei naturaliter et immutabiliter insit ratio universalis et perfecti boni; quod quidem esse non potest nisi natura divina" (*ibid.*, q. 24, a. 7).

[44]". . . cum propter vires inferiores quae intense moventur in aliquid, intercipitur actus rationis, ut non limpide et firmiter suum iudicium de bono voluntati proponat; sicut cum aliquis habens rectam existimationem de castitate servanda, per concupiscentiam delectabilis appetit contrarium castitati, propter hoc quod iudicium aliqualiter a concupiscentia ligatur" (*ibid.*, a. 8).

[45]*Ethica Nichomachea* 1114b1.

[46]"Scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia particularis: eo quod actiones sunt singularia. Unde non est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam universalem, absente consideratione in particulari" (*ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad 1).

[47]"Cum enim significet *rectam rationem agibilium*, quidam intelligunt eam sic infra limites intellectus, ut, eam in intellectu absolute credentes, nihil aliud significare dicant nisi rectum dictamen agibilium: ita quod prudentia nil aliud significat nisi rationem recte monstrantem in particulari agibili quid, quomodo, qualiter, etc., eligendum sit" (*In ST*, I-II, q. 58, a. 5, n. II).

[48]". . . rectam agibilium rationem appetitu recto particularis finis factam et firmatam" (*ibid.*).

[49]"Quia sicut praecipere non est intelligibile quin dependeat ab appetitu, praecipit enim quilibet volens; ita recte praecipere sibi ipsi in huiusmodi moralibus, non est nisi a recto appetitu" (*ibid.*, n. III).

The disposition of the agent enters into his judgment of the good and colors that judgment so that, as Aristotle remarks[45], *qualis unusquisque est, talis finis ei videtur.* Thus the agent may be fully cognizant of the rightness or wrongness of an action *in universali;* but in judging whether or not this particular action is such, his subjective disposition can lead him into error. Nor is this a small danger. The universal science of action does not play the principal role in operation, even though it is most certain; actions are singular and are more immediately affected by the "particular science." A theoretical knowledge of the good does not prevent our doing the wrong thing in the particular instance.[46]

All of this becomes quite clear when we consider the nature of the practical syllogism, the prudential judgment. Prudence is defined as *recta ratio agibilium,* reason rectified with regard to action. This definition can give rise to a confusion which Cajetan is at pains to dissipate, for one might think that prudence is a lofty intellectual thing, no more than a correct dictum as to actions.[47] The implication would be that we are able intellectually to exhaust the circumstances of our acts and so judge of what we are to do. A true interpretation of the definition is that prudence is "right reason concerning human acts made firm by the rectified desire of a particular end."[48] The essential difference here is that prudence is not conceived as within the limits of intellect but dependent upon something outside of intellect; that is, rectified appetite. This is manifest when we consider that the proper act of prudence is to command, and

> since commanding is unintelligible without a dependence on appetite, one who commands must also will; thus rightly to command oneself in moral matters of this kind presupposes rectified appetite.[49]

The command is the conclusion of the practical syllogism. The major is a universal precept; the minor is its application to the particular circumstances. Cajetan notes that it is important to realize that the command which is the conclusion is not *in actu signato;* that is, a proposition stating what must be done here and now. Rather the

command is *in actu exercito;* it is an action.[50] Already with the appearance of the minor we are *extra limites intellectus.*

The similarity between Kierkegaard's double reflection and the practical syllogism is obvious. And when we recall that there is a kind of reflection involved in indirect communication, it is clear what Kierkegaard is about. He wants to influence the judgment of others in such a way that what he has to say will not be *infra limites intellectus.* He wants so to insinuate himself into the passional nature of man that his listener will be moved appetitively rather than merely cognitively. It is in these terms, it would seem, that we must approach the existential dialectic.

From this vantage point, it will be well to listen again to Kierkegaard's invective against speculation when it would prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. Such proofs have no meaning, he argues, for one can accept them and still live as if death were the end.

> Systematically, immortality cannot be proved at all. The fault does not lie in the proofs, but in the fact that people will not understand that viewed systematically the whole question is nonsense, so that instead of seeking outward proofs, one had better seek to become a little subjective. Immortality is the most passionate interest of subjectivity; precisely in the interest lies the proof.[51]

Now it is certainly obvious that if practical doctrine does not move the will, speculative doctrine will be even less capable of doing so. What Kierkegaard seems to be demanding is succinctly answered in

[50] *Ibid.*, n. VIII.

[51] *Postscript*, p. 155.

[52] "The Nature of Man and His Historical Being," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, v (1949), 277.

[53] "Nec quaelibet relatio ad opus facit intellectum esse practicum: quia simplex speculatio potest alicui esse remota occasio aliquid operandi; sicut philosophus speculatur animam esse immortalem, et exinde sicut a causa remota sumere potest occasionem aliquid operandi" (*De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 4).

[54] *Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 9.

[55] *Super Evangelium Ioannis*, cap. xiii, lect. 1. Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2.

[56] *Super Evangelium Ioannis*, cap. xiii, lect. 1.

[57] *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 1, n. 6. St. Albert expatiates on this: "Aliter etiam est in poetica, quae ex fictis et imaginatione movere intendit ad delectationem, vel abominationem, vel appetitum, vel amorem, vel odium. Et ideo fabula et recitatione factorum heroicorum, et in oratione cantu utitur modulato brevi et longo, ut demulceat auditum, ut facilius provocet" (*De Praedicabilibus* [Edition de l'Université Laval], p. 21b).

[58] *In I ad Timotheum*, lect. 2.

[59] "Cum enim eadem res sub diversis conditionibus considerari potest, et de-

the following words of Charles De Koninck:

> It has been said that the demonstrations of God's existence and of the immortality of the soul—some have included Faith as well—could hardly be certain unless they irresistibly compel one to pursue the good and be a saint, as if such knowledge had to be practical truth and thus constitute prudential judgments.[52]

Speculation can, of course, be a remote occasion for action, something which does not make it practical.[53] Practical science, on the other hand, is a proximate norm, for it considers an operable object and seeks its reasons and causes.

Can one man influence the will of another? Obviously this question must first be answered before we worry about the method of influencing. The question is not concerned with what moves the will as an object but with what moves the will as an efficient cause.[54] No one, not even God, can necessitate the will in acting upon it as an efficient cause; the creature can, however, indirectly influence the will, and in this case there obviously can be no question of a necessary immutation of the will. A man's will can be indirectly influenced by the presentation of objects as good to him, by proportioning them to the recipient in such a way that they will appeal to him as an individual.[55] It is interesting to note that St. Thomas calls this method *per modum suggerentis* an indirect one.[56] We remember that Kierkegaard held that such a method would make use of art the better to realize its end; and once again he finds support in a tradition which holds that "it is characteristic of the poet that he leads to virtue by means of a delightful representation."[57] St. Thomas notes that the majority are more easily convinced by representation than by argument, adding that the truth can be hidden in fables and thus communicated to the simple.[58]

Since a man often proportions objects to his own sensible nature by emphasizing one aspect rather than another, he may use the same method in influencing another.

> Since anything can be considered under various conditions and thus rendered horrible or delightful, reason quells sensuality by means of a delightful or horrible image, depending on how it seems to it, and in this way sensuality is moved to joy or sorrow.[59]

The role of imagination in this process should not be overlooked, for it enables us to see the role of art and better understand what Aristotle meant by its cathartic function. An artistic presentation has a way all its own of affecting the passions and disposing a man for either good or evil. We have already seen the effect such a disposition can have on the judgment of reason; the indirect method, accordingly, is well calculated to influence ultimately the highest faculties of man. The artistic, indirect method of communication appears to be the most effective. Incidentally, those who are scandalized at seeing poetry listed among the divisions of logic[60] overlook the passage from one thing to another which is the *ratio communis* saved in poetry. To deplore the "cognitive" aspect of poetry is indicative of a desire to separate the passions from the integral man.

In its general outlines, then, Kierkegaard's method of indirect communication finds a complementary doctrine in the tradition. The unique effectiveness of the artistic method is, of course, obvious to common sense; but in Kierkegaard and St. Thomas we find attempts to articulate why this is so. There remains only to see if this is all that Kierkegaard intended by indirect communication. Paradoxically enough, he later waxed eloquent on the dangers of indirect communication.

VI. Repudiation of the Dialectic

Having gone to some lengths to justify Kierkegaard's indirect method, we may be a trifle abashed to find that the volatile Dane came finally to repudiate this method and to call out for something more direct. But, as students of Kierkegaard's existential dialectic, we are enrolled in the "school of patience" and even this *coup* must be taken gracefully. Moreover, Kierkegaard's rejection is not as sweeping as at first it may appear; indeed, if it were, it would entail dropping his very valid observations on the nature of action, something Kierkegaard never did.

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lectabilis et horribilis reddi, ratio opponit sensualitati mediante imaginatione rem aliquam sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis, secundum quod ei videtur; et sic sensualitas movetur ad gaudium vel tristitiam" (*De Ver.*, q. 25, a. 4).

[60] *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 1, n. 6.

[61] *Postscript*, pp. 468-93.

[62] P. 209.

[63] *Training in Christianity*, pp. 90-91.

[64] *Journals*, n. 1226.

[65] Soeren Kierkegaard, *Diario*, I, a cura de Cornelio Fabro (Morcelliana-Brescia, 1948), p. 446.

[66] *Journals*, n. 809.

The existential dialectic was geared to the Christian life, the high point of which, according to Johannes Climacus, is the religion of hidden inwardness.[61] This consists in an absolute dedication to an eternal life with a total lack of exterior show. The life of the spirit, being spirit, does not require any bodily manifestation of worship. If the Christian goes to church he does so in order not to appear different—if no one went to church, neither would he. The danger of this position is stated in *Training in Christianity.*

> On the other hand, if so-called established Christendom maybe does not expressly call itself the Church triumphant, perhaps disdaining this name as an externality, it nevertheless produces the same confusion by means of 'hidden inwardness'; for, again, established Christendom, where all are Christians, but only in hidden inwardness, resembles the militant Church just as little as the stillness of death resembles vociferous passion.[62]

Could not this desire to remain hidden be prompted by the disinclination to shoulder the difficulties following on being marked as a Christian?[63] Nothing, he concluded, was more contrary to Christianity, which desires to make all things manifest, than hidden inwardness.[64] Cornelio Fabro seems to think that what Kierkegaard was seeking was sacramental confession,[65] but perhaps the difficulty is a more extensive one. It will be remembered that Kierkegaard has insisted that practical knowledge can only be communicated indirectly. But Christianity is the way of life *par excellence.* Hidden, mysterious, obscure, Christianity must never be presented as a doctrine. And yet Christianity must be proclaimed openly and directly.

> The communication of Christianity must ultimately end in 'bearing witness', the maieutic form can never be final. For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must be proclaimed.[66]

This is the difficulty, and its resolution seems to redeem Kierkegaard from total subjectivism, moral relativism. Does not this truth point backward through the literature as a recognition that there must be objective norms, a direct as well as an indirect communication when it is question of action? With regard to Christianity, the application

is striking. Indirect communication is ultimately rooted in human intelligence, and in Christianity God must be allowed to take over.[67] So too, in action in general, unless the end is given, prudence would be identical with art.[68]

Indirect communication is present in a new form in Christ. There are two kinds of indirect communication, we are told, one which makes use of the double reflection and another which arises owing to the relation between the communicator and his communication.[69] No matter how directly Christ might say, "I am God," the fact that He is an individual human being creates a difficulty for the recipient. Faith is required if one is to accept what Christ says of Himself.[70]

VII. Concluding Postscript

Kierkegaard never rejected indirect communication as we have interpreted it in the body of this paper; and we have seen not only that it is justifiable but that it is necessary. His reference to Clement of Alexandria and the notion that the truths of faith must be hidden is not the major motif of the existential dialectic.[71] What the Dane so validly insists upon is the need for subtlety if we are to influence another. This recognition saves us from the twin evils of casuistry and

[67]*Ibid.*

[68]The end to which the work of art must conform is not given by nature, but chosen by the artist. "Et inde est quod magis laudatur artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis" (*ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 4).

[69]*Training in Christianity*, p. 133.

[70]*Ibid.*, pp. 134 ff.

[71]Cf. *Repetition*, p. 149. Nevertheless, one could easily believe that this notion had something to do with Kierkegaard's later uneasiness with indirect communication; as he often declared, he was without authority, and for him to cloak revealed truth was a species of usurpation. For the remarks of St. Thomas on this rather common thought of the fathers that divine truth should be hidden in obscurity, see *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 4.

[72]Cf. Paul L. Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory," *Ethics*, LXIII (April, 1953), pp. 157-70. Professor Holmer moves from the position that the whole literature has no "immediate moral significance" to conclude that Kierkegaard intended to show that existential problems could be discussed dispassionately but that the exigencies of action could not be met by mere discussion. One has no doubt that this is a facet of Kierkegaard, but there are degrees of immediacy when it is question of action, as we have seen in our discussion of the "twilight zone." In order to have *immediate* moral significance, the literature would have to constitute prudential decisions for the reader. Nonetheless, I do not think that what appears is incompatible with Dr. Holmer's position; his article cannot be recommended too highly.

[73]*Point of View*, p. 147.

[74]Cf. David F. Swenson, *Something about Kierkegaard*, pp. 111-34.

moral intimidation. This is a major contribution of Kierkegaard, and it is central to his thought. *What* he had to say is inextricably bound up with *how* he said it.

In conclusion, let us note that much of the Kierkegaardian literature is obviously remote from the individual act; page after page is devoted to theoretical problems having little or no proximate bearing on the ethical activity of the reader. It is possible to see only this side of Kierkegaard and conclude that his interest was merely to draw out the logical consequences of various views.[72] But would not this be to forget that the literature is *uno tenore*,[73] that Kierkegaard never forgot his ultimate teleology which was to clear the ground for action in a rather proximate way?[74] If what we have been saying is true, such concentration might end in distortion. The ambiguity of our *Janus bifrons* was never desired for itself: the vast complexity of Kierkegaard's literature was intended to progress from complexity to the simplicity of Christian existence. The tool of his task, we have seen, was most aptly chosen.

Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division

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The joint meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions with the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association was held December 28-30, 1955, at the University of California, Berkeley. In contrast to some previous sessions, the papers showed a lessening emphasis on the semantic and logistical approach, together with a broadening in the scope of the analysis used. This was to be seen in the tenth "Carus Lecture," "An Inquiry concerning Moral Understanding," given by Arthur E. Murphy (University of Washington). Professor Murphy criticized the insufficiency of such ethical systems as empiricism, intuitionism, emotive morality, and the Kantian categorical imperative. There is a difference between a *liking* and a *moral judgment* in that the latter demands rational justification. Moral questions must be resolved by reasons. However, Professor Murphy did not have much hope of settling which reasons are to be accepted. Where maxims of various cultures differ we must seek common ground and be content with a *modus vivendi*, as in the international sphere, while trying to resolve by practical means differences in ethical beliefs. The examples used indicated he was largely concerned with social morality.

In his presidential address, Bertram Jessup (University of Oregon) analyzed the date of aesthetics. He noted that any object may produce an aesthetic experience which is so varied as to defy classification. Beauty, while not found in form alone nor an inherent quality, is something objective, though the aesthetic experience is subjective. Just as any object may have economic value in that it can be traded, so, too, any object may have aesthetic value in that it can produce aesthetic pleasure.

The papers on knowledge and ethics reflected more of this current interest in philosophical analysis. In his "Empiricism and Human Practice," Professor William S. Snyder argued that "strict empiricism" in the sense of Hume or Reichenbach cannot justify itself theoretically, nor on its own grounds should it attempt to do so; on the other hand it is not susceptible of a theoretical refutation. Practice, however, works against it. Arthur Smullyan (University of Washington) gave a logically intricate study of the problems involved in justifying empirical knowledge. Wallace I. Matson (University of California) treated of "The Irrelevance of Free Will to Moral Responsibility, and the Vacuity of the Latter," in which he attempted to

(Continued on page 280)

ESSENCE AND SUPPOSIT IN THE ANGELS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

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The classic commentators on St. Thomas mention a difficulty of interpretation—"a great difficulty" according to John of St. Thomas[1]—concerning essence and supposit in the angels. Substance has two fundamental meanings: the substantial essence and the existing whole to which essence belongs, the supposit.[2] St. Thomas seems to teach that essence and supposit are really distinct in all creatures. He also seems to teach that essence and supposit are the same in the angels. The difficulty caused by this at least apparent contradiction would seem at first sight far removed from the current interests even of Thomistic metaphysicians. But the issues involved are not only textual or historical but are of speculative importance. Conflicting theories about the formal constituent of the supposit claim the support of St. Thomas. A neutral observer might be led to suspect that St. Thomas's own point of view must have been different from that of his successors. Light may be cast upon this possibility by considering a context in which he seems to contradict later theories and himself as well. Then, too, since the points at issue are concerned in one way or another with the act of existence, indirect light may be thrown on the special sense in which St. Thomas, as compared with both his masters and some of his disciples, may be called an existential philosopher.

It is the constant teaching of St. Thomas that in all finite beings essence is distinct from the act of existence by which the supposit is real. The unity of the supposit is founded in the act of existence.[3] The act of existence pertains to the very constitution of the supposit as its term.[4] The supposit, not the essence, is the subject of existence.[5] It

would seem to follow, then, that in all finite beings essence is distinct from the supposit as a principle from the totality of which it is a principle. In fact, St. Thomas expressly teaches that in no creature, not even the angel, can essence and supposit be entirely the same, for wherever there is something more than the essence there must be a

[1]*Cursus Theologicus, In ST,* I, q. 3, disp. 4, diff. 3, a. 1, n. 31. For his solution, *ibid.,* nos. 32-37. Cf. Cajetan, *In ST,* I, q. 3, a. 3.

[2]"Uno modo dicitur 'substantia quidditas rei', quam significat definitio, secundum quod definitio significat substantiam rei . . . alio modo dicitur substantia 'subiectum vel suppositum' quod subsistit in genere substantiae" (*ST,* I, q. 29, a. 2). The text for all works that have appeared in it is that of the Leonine edition. Other references are to the Piana text as found in the Parma edition. Cf. *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 1; *ST,* III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3; *In I Sent.,* d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 and d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5; *In VII Metaphys.,* lect. 2 and lect. 13; *In X Metaphys.,* lect. 4; *Quodl.,* III, q. 2, a. 4, ad 1.

[3]". . . sed *esse* est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi . . ." (*Quodl.,* IX, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2). Cf. *ST,* III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4; *In III Sent.,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 1 and d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *Compend. Theol.,* cap. 212.

[4]"Nam esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae, et sic quantum ad hoc se habet in ratione termini" (*ST,* III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4).

[5]"Esse autem pertinet et ad hypostasim et ad naturam: ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album et humanitate est aliquis homo" (*ibid.,* q. 17, a. 2). ". . . unde nec natura rei nec partes ejus proprie dicuntur esse . . . sed suppositum completum quod est secundum omnia illa" (*In III Sent.,* d. 6, q. 2, a. 2). Cf. *Quodl.,* IX, q. 2, a. 2; *De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 12; *ibid.,* a. 3, ad 2 and a. 8, ad 3; *In I Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 and a. 4; *In III Sent.,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 1. Cf. also *ST,* I, q. 45, a. 5 and related texts where form is said to be that by which something is.

[6]"In solo autem Deo non invenitur aliquod accidens praeter ejus essentiam, quia suum esse est sua essentia, ut dictum est; et ideo in Deo est omnino idem suppositum et natura. In angelo autem non est omnino idem: quia aliquid accidit ei praeter id quod est de ratione speciei: quia et ipsum esse angeli est praeter ejus essentiam seu naturam; et alia quaedam ei accidunt . . . quae omnino pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam" (*Quodl.,* II, q. 2, a. 4). Cf. J. Winardy, "Le Quodlibet II, de s. Thomas et la notion de suppôt," *Epherimedes Theologicae Lovaniensis,* XI (1934), 5-29. For the sense in which *esse* may be improperly called an accident ". . . esse non dicitur accidens quod sit in genere accidentis, si loquamur de esse substantiae (est enim actus essentiae), sed per quamdam similitudinem; quia non est pars essentiae, sicut nec accidens" (*De Pot.,* q. 5, a. 4, ad 3). Cf. *Quodl.,* II, q. 2, a. 3, c. et ad 2; *Quodl.,* V, q. 5, a. 5; *In IV Metaphys.,* lect. 2.

[7]". . . dicendum quod natura, secundum se considerata, prout in abstracto significatur, non vere potest praedicari de supposito seu persona nisi in Deo in quo non differt quod est et quo est ut in Prima Parte habitum est" (*ST,* III, q. 17, a. 1). Cf. *ibid.,* q. 2, a. 2, where, however, it is said that the distinction ". . . maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita." For the same qualification ". . . sicut apparet praecipue in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita" (*De Unione,* a. 1).

For the identity of *quod est* and *quo est* in God, cf. *ST,* I, q. 29, a. 4, ad 1 and q. 40, a. 1. When in *ST,* I, the identity of *quod est* and *quo est* is asserted of God

distinction between essence and that of which it is the essence.[6] The nature considered in itself, as it is signified in the abstract, cannot be predicated of the supposit or person except in God, for whom there is no difference between essence and existence.[7] It is no wonder, then, that Scholastic philosophers and theologians seem generally agreed that essence and supposit are distinct in all creatures.[8]

The Difficulty Caused by St. Thomas's Identification of Essence and Supposit in the Angels

So far there would seem to be no problem. But there is a whole series of texts in which St. Thomas has stated that while essence and supposit differ in all material things, yet, where an essence without matter is to be found—not only in God but in the angels as well—there is an identity of essence and supposit.[9] In things which do not have a form in matter there can be no distinction between thing and essence. The difficulty caused by these statements, great enough in any case, is increased if approached from the standpoint of the Scholastic controversy concerning the formal constituent of the supposit. What does the supposit have that even the individuated essence lacks? Whether we say with many Thomists that the very act of existence constitutes the supposit or with the classical Thomistic school that a mode of subsistence plays this role,[10] the fact remains

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and denied of the angels (*ST*, I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3 and q. 75, a. 5, ad 4) the reference is to essence and existence (cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1; *Quodl.*, IX, q. 4, a. 6; *CG*, II, cap. 54), not to the essence as distinguished from the supposit. For *quo* and *quod* in St. Thomas, cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le De Ente et Essentia* (Paris, 1948), pp. 185-99, and E. Schiltz, "La place de 'quod est' et 'quo est' dans la métaphysique thomiste," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), XL (1937), 22-55.

[8]Cajetan, *In ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3, no. 8; John of St. Thomas, *In ST*, I, q. 3, a. 1, disp. 4, diff. 1, no. 8; Francis Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 34, sect. 3, nos. 9-10. Suarez did not, however, think the distinction between supposit and essence could be arrived at without the knowledge by revelation of the Incarnation and Trinity (*ibid.*, sect. 2, no. 4).

[9]*In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 5 and lect. 11; *In VIII Metaphys.*, lect. 3; *In III de An.*, lect. 8; *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 8, a. 4 and q. 9, a. 1; *CG*, IV, cap. 55; *In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Philippenses*, cap. 2, lect. 2; *ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3; *De An.*, a. 17, ad 10.

[10]For an account of the state of the controversy before the introduction of the

that St. Thomas repeatedly called what is simply speaking not a supposit, a supposit.[11] Whether the concrete existing thing, constituted such by an act of existence, or the essence terminated by a mode so as to receive an act of existence and become a concrete existing thing, is the supposit, in any case either the act of existence itself or some

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theory of Tiphanus, see Suarez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 34, sect. 2-4. For the more recent state of the question, see any good manual or A. Michel, "Hypostase" in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* Vol. 7, Part 1, pp. 411-29. The question has been put in a new light by the articles of Herman Diepen, O.S.B., in the *Revue Thomiste*, especially "La Critique du basilisme selon saint Thomas d' Aquin," 1950, pp. 82-118, pp. 290-329, and by J. Maritain, "Sur la notion du subsistence," *Revue Thomiste*, 1954, pp. 242-56, to be published in the new English translation of *Les Degrés du savoir*. According to this new view the function of the mode of subsistence is not to terminate the essence so as to render it capable of receiving existence but rather to constitute a subject exercising the act of existence.

[11]*Quodl.*, II (1269-72, Mandonnet and Walz; 1272, Van Steenberghen); *ST*, III (1272, Grabmann; 1272-73, Walz). The exceptions, *In I Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1 and *In I Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, do not give the same reason for the distinction that is stated later. The first text gives no reason but simply states that in creatures acts belong to supposits, not natures—a consequence of the distinction between essence and supposit rather than a reason for it. The second states that wherever there is matter "vel alicujus quod loco materiae se habet" hypostasis and essence are not the same. In view of their failure to conform to the pattern of an appeal to Aristotle's authority made in later works, it is perhaps unlikely that these texts were thoroughly revised at a later date. Cf. *infra*, n. 12.

If the commentary of Hannibaldus printed with the works of St. Thomas may be taken as evidence of the earlier text of St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences*, the difficulty about essence and supposit in the angels is not suppressed. While in a parallel text of Hannibaldus one reference to the distinction of essence and supposit in all creatures disappears (*Super Libris Magistri Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum, In I Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1), a seeming contradiction remains. It is said that essence differs from supposit only in material things. "Unde differentia naturae et suppositi non invenitur nisi in habentibus materiam" (*ibid.; In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1). There is, however, a distinction of *quod est* and *esse* in all creatures (*ibid.*, ad 2). On the other hand, essence and person are really distinct in all creatures. "In omnibus ergo rebus in quibus invenitur aliquid praeter principia essentialia differt essentia et persona realiter, et hoc est in omni creatura" (*ibid.; In I Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1).

[12]Roland-Gosselin speaks of St. Thomas's not changing his teaching until ". . . il étudia de nouveau, et pour elle-même, a l'occasion d'une dispute quodlibétique, la question des rapports entre le suppôt et la nature dans les anges." He mentions the exceptions to this statement found in the *Commentary on the Sentences, Le De Ente*, p. 192. L. B. Gillon writes of "des hesitations de saint Thomas sur la distinction du suppôt et de la nature chez l'ange . . ." ("Thomas d'Aquin, v. signification historique de la théologie de saint Thomas," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. xv, 651-93, 675a). An appeal to the authority of Aristotle for the principle that where there is anything besides essence there must be a distinction between essence and that of which it is the essence seems to be lacking in the earliest texts. For such an appeal, cf. *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 11; *In VIII Metaphys.*, lect. 3; *In III de An.*, lect. 8; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1; *Quodl.*, II, q. 2, a. 4.

[13]For these terms in St. Albert, see Roland-Gosselin, *Le De ente*, pp. 172-74.

[14]"Suppositum autem et hoc aliquid in ratione sui habent, quod sint compositum

reference to it is added to the essence. The essence by itself cannot then be the supposit in any creature.

A Purely Historical Answer to the Difficulty Not Sufficient

Since the texts in which St. Thomas asserts the distinction between essence and supposit in all creatures seem to date generally, though not universally, from later in his career than those in which he confined the distinction to material things, it might seem plausible to argue for a process of development in the course of which St. Thomas changed his mind. There may have been a development in which St. Thomas's thought became more explicit,[12] and a study might be made exploring the historical background of the distinction between *quod est* and *quo est*.[13] Within the framework of a Boethian tradition it would seem that the concrete subject, that which is, must always be distinct from the form by which it is what it is; and so a distinction between a particularized subject and that by which it participates the separate intelligibility in which it shares must exist in all creatures.[14] In this tradition, and in kindred Platonic complexes, a sense in which essence and supposit are distinct in all creatures becomes obvious. When, on the other hand, individuation is interpreted according to Aristotle as having its basis in the composition of form and matter, the difference between general and particular must disappear where there is only form, since the individual subject is no longer the result of a concretion of forms but of the limitation and reception of form by matter. As a result, the philosophical basis for the distinction between essence and supposit seems to disappear; but when the problem is reconsidered from the aspect of existence, it is again clear that essence, whether composed as in material being, or simple form as in the angel, must be distinct from the existing whole of which it is a principle.

A study of the historical background might, then, give a partial psychological explanation for a certain development in St. Thomas's expression; but the account of such a development would give no answer to the real problem involved. From the earliest stage of his career known to us St. Thomas held that the supposit as that which

exists is opposed to the essence, that by which something exists.[15] There must be a reason why not just once or twice by inadvertence but repeatedly St. Thomas failed to assert the distinction of essence and supposit in all creatures, a distinction that seems to follow from premises always held by him. For a real answer, a context in which essence and supposit are identical in the angel must be made explicit as well as another more obvious context in which they are different.

When St. Thomas speaks of essence and supposit as distinct even

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ad minus ex quod est et quo est: omne enim suppositum alicui substat communi, scilicet naturae, qua est in genere vel specie illius naturae: et omne quod substat, res naturae determinata est in illa natura ad hoc quod est signatum hoc aliquid. Et per hoc patet, quod in ratione suppositi est, quod compositum sit" (St. Albert, *Summa Theologica,* II, tract. 4, q. 13, mem. 1, sol. [ed. Vives], vol. 32, p. 160). For the Boethian background see A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul* (Toronto, 1934), pp. 116-17 (to which work I owe the quotation from St. Albert) and Bernard J. Muller-Thym, *The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of Hochheim* (New York, 1939), pp. 62-63.

[15]*In III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; d. 14, q. 1, a. 1; d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. Cf. also *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 and a. 4.

[16]*Quodl.*, II, q. 2, a. 4.

[17]*ST*, III, q. 17, a. 1. Cf. *supra,* n. 7.

[18]"In substantiis vero simplicibus nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti, cum non est in eis materia individualis naturam communem individuans; sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1). "Sed cum quidditas quae sequitur compositionem dependeat ex partibus oportet quod ipsa non sit subsistens in esse quod sibi acquiritur, sed ipsum compositum quod suppositum dicitur . . ." (*In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1). ". . . quia in homine aliud est in natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositum; non autem in angelo, qui immaterialis est" (*CG*, IV, cap. 55). "In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia" (*ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3). "In substantiis autem separatis, quia immateriales sunt, natura speciei non recipitur in aliqua materia individuante, sed est ipsa natura per se subsistens; unde non est in eis aliud habens quidditatem, et aliud quidditas ipsa . . ." (*De An.*, a. 17, ad 10).

[19]Cajetan, *In ST*, I, q. 3, no. 2; Suarez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 34, sect. 3, no. 17. John of St. Thomas says that St. Thomas sometimes speaks of the supposit formally as terminated by its mode, sometimes "radicaliter seu originative" as in the individuating principles from which this mode has its origin (*In ST*, I, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 1, diff. 3, nos. 33-34). He wishes to avoid the opinion ". . . sumitur ex Cajetano . . ." (*ibid.*) held by Suarez (*Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 34, sect. 3, no. 17) and others that the nature in its individuating principles as such is sometimes identified with the supposit by St. Thomas, Gouker Mar 29 Gal 15 77081 and therefore says that it is only the individuated nature considered as the origin or source of the terminating mode of subsistence that is so identified.

[20]". . . in rebus creatis principia individuantia duo habent; quorum unum est quod sunt principium subsistendi (natura enim communis de se non subsistit nisi in singularibus); aliud est quod per principia individuantia supposita naturae communis ab invicem distinguuntur" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5, ad 13).

[21]"In divinis autem proprietates personales hoc solum habent quod supposita divinae naturae ab invicem distinguuntur, non autem sunt principium subsistendi divinae essentiae; ipsa enim divina essentia

in the angels his meaning seems clear enough. The distinction is based upon that between essence and existence. St. Thomas does not say that since existence constitutes the supposit, where there is no act of existence there can be no supposit but instead that where there is anything besides essence, supposit and essence must be distinct. In creatures the act of existence *et alia quaedam* are not the same as the essence. Therefore, in all creatures essence and supposit must be distinct.[16] Where anything besides the essence is found, this is an indication that essence is not the existing whole or supposit; so only in God, for whom essence and existence are the same, is there no real distinction between essence and supposit.[17]

Essence Identical with the Supposit as Rendering It Distinct

In another group of texts, however, St. Thomas bases the difference between essence and supposit not on the distinction between essence and existence but on that between form and matter. Only in the material substance is there a distinction between essence and supposit. The essence as *quod*, as subject of existence, is identical with the supposit. The essence as existing differs from the essence as principle of intelligibility in material things. No such distinction can exist in the angels.[18] In some sense the individuated essence is here identified by St. Thomas with the supposit.[19] This seems evident enough. The real difficulty to be explained is how St. Thomas ever could maintain such a position. His distinction between two functions of the individuating principles of the essence may provide an answer. The individuating principles limit and receive the act of existence, but they also render the resulting whole distinct from other supposits.[20] It is, then, by the essence that created supposits are normally distinguished—by the essence as individuated through matter when there are several individuals to a species.

In God the divine persons subsist by an act of existence which is identical with the divine nature, but they are distinct by the relations of origin. Creatures subsist by the act of substantial existence which is limited and received by their essence, but they are also distinct by the essence.[21] In both God and creatures what makes something subsist is

the act of existence. God's essence as identical with His existence, and the essence in a creature as limiting and receiving existence, are analogously principles of subsisting; but when St. Thomas speaks of that from which the rational being is a subsistence or supposit, "ex quo subsistentiam habet,"[22] he is not referring to the act of existence.

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est secundum se subsistens; sed e converso proprietates personales habent quod subsistant ab essentia; ex eo enim paternitas habet quod sit res subsistens, quia essentia divina, cui est idem secundum rem, est res subsistens; ut inde sequatur quod sicut essentia divina est Deus, ita paternitas est Deus. Et ex hoc est etiam quod essentia divina non multiplicatur secundum numerum ex pluralitate suorum suppositorum, sicut accidit in istis inferioribus. Nam ex eo aliquid secundum numerum multiplicatur, ex quo subsistentiam habet. Licet autem divina essentia secundum seipsum, ut ita dicam individuetur quantum ad hoc quod est per se subsistere; tamen ipsa una existente secundum numerum sunt in divinis plura supposita ab invicem distincta per relationes subsistentes" (*ibid.*).

[22]*Ibid.*

[23]The explicit notion of the mode of subsistence seems to be a novelty of later Scholasticism unknown even to Cajetan in his youth. Cf. Degl'Innocenti, "L'opinione giovanile de Gaetano sulla constituzione ontologica de la persona," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), XLIV (1941), pp. 154-56.

Père Diepen admits that the notion of subsistence conceived as independence is not found quite explicitly in St. Thomas, "La critique du basilisme," p. 311. Still less, then, can the explicit notion of the mode as constituting formally the independence be found. For a recent study interpreting St. Thomas as an exponent of the mode, see Garrigou-Lagrange, "Thomisme," VIII, 2, in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* XV, 924b-930b.

The expression, "mode of subsisting," is found in St. Thomas but must not be interpreted in the light of later controversies. St. Thomas speaks of the manner of existing proper to a singular substance and ". . . principium talis modi existendi quod est principium individuationis" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 2, ad 1). Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2. The mode of subsisting is not the principle of subsisting but the way of existing proper to supposits. "Et sic hoc nomen individuum ponitur in definitione personae ad designandum modum subsistendi qui competit substantiis particularibus" (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3).

[24]"Persona igitur in quacumque natura significat id quod est distinctum in natura illa; sicut in humana natura significat has carnes et haec ossa et hanc animam, quae sunt principia individuantia hominem; quae quidem licet non sint de significatione personae, sunt tamen de significatione personae humanae. Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi per relationis originis, ut dictum est supra" (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 4). ". . . forma significata per nomen personae non est essentia absolute, sed illud quod est principium incommunicabilitatis, sive individuationis . . ." (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 6, ad 4).

[25]". . . sicut dictum est, persona requirit completionem. In conjunctione autem aliquorum aliquando ita est quod utrumque incompletum est, sicut patet in unione formae et materiae, quorum utrumque non habet esse completum, et in mixtione, quando utrumque mixtorum partim corrumpitur; unde in talibus haec completio quam requirit persona, neutri debetur sed composito. Aliquando autem unum praeexistit in se completum, et aliud additur et completur per completionem ejus, sicut cibus qui adjungitur homini jam completo; unde completio personalis non debetur cibo, sed homini; et hoc proprie dicitur assumi quod sic in personalitatem alterius trahitur" (*In III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 11, a. 1). ". . . sed aliorum quae personalitatem non causant, non est inconveniens ut additionem recipiat: sicut Socrates recipit additionem scientiae, nutrimenti, et hujusmodi; et tamen haec non individuant ipsum" (*ibid.*, ad 1). When nature is distinguished from per-

Neither is the reference to a mode of subsistence terminating the essence. However cogent the arguments may be for the metaphysical necessity of such a mode, St. Thomas does not explicitly mention it in the many contexts where some such mention might be expected.[23] The possibility may be suggested that apparent implicit references to such a mode are rather to the individual essence, not indeed in its function of limiting and receiving existence but in that of rendering the supposit distinct, or to the analogous role played *in divinis* by the relations of origin.[24] Even if something more than the individuated essence is required if a being is to exercise its act of existence as a supposit, this something more, the mode of subsistence with the kind of entity peculiar to it, is not what St. Thomas has in mind when speaking of that by which a supposit is a supposit. When he speaks of the personality, the person conceived abstractly and formally, what he seems to have directly in mind is that by which the supposit is rendered distinct from other supposits. In God the personalities are the relations that subsist; in creatures, the subsisting essences with their individuating principles.[25] When St. Thomas speaks of the personality being destroyed on the supposition of a hypostatic union between a divine person and a pre-existing angel, what he mentions explicitly in connection with the personality is the nature of the angel.[26] What the supposit is, the essence of the individual, is normally the *ratio* of the supposit among creatures and renders distinct that whole to which both essence, considered as such, and the act of existence be-

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sonality in the Trinity, the reference is to what belongs to the person rendered distinct by relations of origin as contrasted with what belongs to the essence. ". . . forma significata per hoc nomen persona non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde cum sint tres personalitates, idest tres personales proprietates in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, non singulariter sed pluraliter praedicatur de tribus" (*ST*, I, q. 39, a. 4). For personality in the Trinity cf. also *ibid.*, III, q. 3, a. 3.

[26]"Dicendum quod quidem dicunt angelum non esse assumptibilem, quia a principio suae creationis est in sua personalitate perfectus, cum non subiaceat generationi et corruptioni. Unde non posset in unitatem divinae personae assumi nisi eius personalitas destruetur; quod neque convenit incorruptibilitati naturae eius, neque bonitati assumentis, ad quam non pertinet quod aliquid perfectionis in creatura assumpta corrumpat. . . . Potest enim Deus, producendo novam angelicam naturam, copulare eam sibi in unitate personae, et sic nihil praeexistens ibi corrumpetur" (*ST*, III, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3). Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 2; *CG*, IV, cap. 55; *In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Hebraeos*, cap. 2, lect. 4.

long as principles.[27] St. Thomas seems to take for granted that the *ratio* of the supposit is the singular essence. That is why, although *esse* is not part of the specific essence's *ratio*, it is not part of the supposit's either.[28] The act of existence is not part of any created essence, although it is true that the singular exists and not the species. That to which *esse* belongs as a consequent is not, however, an essence but the substantial totality rendered distinct by the singular essence.[29] Hence, that which has the *ratio* of a supposit is not precisely the individuated essence as such. In considering the supposit two factors must always be considered: that by which the supposit is distinct and that by which

[27]". . . quod non omne quod accidit alicui praeter rationem speciei, est determinativum essentiae ipsius, ut oporteat illud poni in ratione ejus, sicut dictum est; et ideo, licet esse non sit de ratione suppositi; quia tamen pertinet ad suppositum et non est de ratione naturae; manifestum est quod suppositum et natura non sunt omnino idem in quibuscumque res non est suum esse" (*Quodl.*, II, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2). The use of *ratio* can only be understood in the context of the objection to which an answer is here given. ". . . sicut esse non ponitur in definitione naturae, ita non poneretur in definitione suppositi vel singularis, si suppositum vel singulare defineretur" (*ibid.*, obj. 2). Here the *ratio* is in one sense the individuated essence.

[28]*Supra*, n. 27.

[29]It is only where the singular nature distinguishes the person that the singular nature can be called the subject of *esse*. The human nature of Christ does not distinguish His person. "Alio modo potest intellegi ut naturae humanae in Christo propria personalitas debeatur, causata ex principiis humanae naturae. Et sic Christus, secundum quod homo non est persona, quia humana natura non est per se seorsum existens a divina natura quod requirit ratio personae" (*ST*, III, q. 16, a. 12). "Sed hoc est proprium homini Christo, quod persona subsistens in humana natura eius non sit causata ex principiis humanae naturae, sed sit aeterna. Et ideo uno modo est persona secundum quod homo, alio modo non sicut dictum est" (*ibid.*, ad 1). Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, quaest. 1; *In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos*, cap. 1, lect. 3.

According to one common opinion among modern Thomists, Christ's human nature is not a personal whole because it does not have its own act of existence. Cf. Billot, *De Verbo Incarnato*. 5 ed. (Rome, 1942) Q. II, Thesis VII, no. 4, pp. 128-38. It can also be said that Christ's human nature is not a person because—and here it differs from the natures of other men—it does not distinguish that to which the act of existence belongs personally. That to which the act of existence belongs personally is the Person of the Word of God constituted by a relation of origin.

[30]"Dicit ergo primo, quod perscrutandum est utrum quodquideratesse cujuscumque, et unumquodque cujus est quodquideratesse, sit idem aut diversum; et similiter de aliis" (*In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 5). Cf. *Metaphysics* Z. 6. 1031a. For the relation of essence and form in Aristotle, see Armand Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 165-76.

[31]*In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 11; *In VIII Metaphys.*, lect. 3; *In III De An.*, lect. 8; *De Pot.*, q. 11, a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 7, a. 4 and q. 9, a. 1; *ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3 and q. 29, a. 2, ad 3; *De An.*, a. 17, ad 10.

[32]". . . principia individuantia omnium formarum, non sunt de essentia earum, sed hoc solum verum est in compositis" (*De An.*, a. 3, ad 13). Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 11, ad 11; *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

it subsists. A failure to distinguish the two factors may be one source of difficulty in the controversy concerning the formal constituent of the supposit, though neither factor seems to play the roles assigned to the mode of subsistence by its proponents. In any case, a real sense has been established in which the individuated essence of the creature is its supposit. The individuated essence in creatures is normally that by which the supposit as a whole is rendered distinct from other supposits.

Essence as Distinguishing the Supposit Differs from Essence as Intelligible Only in Material Things

A reason has now been given why St. Thomas can sometimes identify the essence with its individuating principles and the supposit in finite things. But no answer has been given to the question as to why essence and supposit are distinguished in material things and identified in the angels. It would seem that in all creatures alike, essence as a principle of being is distinct from that of which it is a principle; and in all alike essence as that which renders the supposit distinct is identical with the supposit. A contrast, however, exists between the essence as principle of intelligibility or definition and essence as distinguishing the supposit, in material things and not in the angels. St. Thomas understands this distinction to be the same as one made by Aristotle between essence and that of which it is the essence.[30] In establishing such a distinction, the act of existence, as well as accidents in the proper sense of the term, plays no part. Though in another context the presence of anything besides essence is used to prove the distinction of essence and supposit in all creatures, in the group of texts now under consideration[31] there is question only of the substantial essence and the principles individuating it. These principles, though accidents in the sense that they are outside the specific essence, are in the real order not accidents at all but are constitutive of the individual substantial essence. In the composite the principles individuating the form are part of the essence.[32]

The context now under discussion does not belong to logic. Logic deals with mental intentions and not with realities or the essence of realities. The essence found in reality is not a logical intention but

the principle from which logical intentions are derived.[33] On the plane of logic, essence and that of which it is the essence are identical. Definition and that of which it is the definition, *man* and *mortal rational animal,* are the same logically.[34] In logic the only exception is the case of an accidental unity. *White man* is substantially not *white man* but *man.* Therefore, even for the logician there is a distinction between essence and that of which it is the essence in accidental unities;[35] but from the logician's viewpoint essence and that of which it is the essence are the same in substantial unities. According to Aristotle as interpreted by St. Thomas, if a shift is made from logic to the philosophy of the real, from a comparison of mental intentions to a comparison of the intelligible content of the intention with the subject in which the intention is verified, there is a difference. Essence and that of which it is the essence are identical only in beings without matter and distinct in all material things. Since in material things the individual contains something (that which is due to individual matter) not rendered intelligible by the specific essence, it is necessary that essence and that of which it is the essence should be different from each other.[36] In material things, and not in pure spirits, the common nature is received in individuating matter and is compared to the particular substance as its formal part in the way humanity is compared to Socrates.[37]

Essence and Supposit Never Distinct as Act and Potency in the Real Order

There is, then, a context in which the essence of the composite differs from its supposit and the supposit can be said to receive and have

[33]*De Ente,* cap. 3; *In VII Metaphys.,* lect. 2 and lect. 5.

[34]". . . quod quid est esse est id quod definitio significat. Unde, cum definitio praedicetur de definito, oportet quod quid est esse de definito praedicari. Non igitur est quod quid est esse hominis humanitas quae de homine non praedicatur sed animal rationale mortale" (*In VII Metaphys.,* lect. 5). "Et ideo superius ubi logice consideravit de quod quid erat esse non exclusit substantias materiales, quin in illis etiam esset idem quod quid est cum eo cujus est. Homo enim communis est idem cum suo quod quid est logice loquendo" (*ibid.,* lect. 11).

[35]"Ostendit in quibus quod praemissum est non sit verum; dicens, quod quodquideratesse pro tanto videtur esse non aliud ab eo cujus est, quia est ejus substantia; itaque in illis, quae praedicantur secundum accidens, et non dicunt substantiam subjecti, videtur esse diversum quodquideratesse praedicati a subjecto. Alterum enim est id 'quod est esse albo homini' idest quodquideratesse albi hominis, ab eo quod

the essence as a formal part,[36] but the meaning cannot be that the existing reality is resolved into principles as act and potency. For St. Thomas it is impossible that there should be such a composition of essence and supposit in the real order. Nothing receives essence

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est albus homo. Quod sic videtur, quia cum dicitur, homo albus, supponitur homo; idem enim est homo, et albus homo, ut dicunt. Quod enim praedicatur de homine albo, non praedicatur de eo nisi quia praedicatur de homine. Accidens enim non est subjectum, nisi ratione substantiae" (*ibid.*, lect. 5).

[36]"Nunc autem postquam jam descendit ad principia naturalia quae sunt materia et forma, et ostendit quomodo diversimodo comparantur ad universale et particulare quod subsistit in natura, excipit hic ab eo quod supra dixerat idem esse quod quid est cum unoquoque, substantias materiales in rerum natura existens. Relinquitur autem quod illae substantiae quod sunt formae tantum subsistentes, non habent aliquid per quod individuentur, quod sit extra rationem rei vel speciei significantem quodquidest. Et ideo in illis simpliciter verum est, quod quaelibet illorum est suum quod quid erat esse," (*ibid.*, lect. 11). "Quaecumque vero sunt sicut materia, vel etiam sunt concepta cum materia, sicut composita quae habent in sui ratione materiam in istis non est idem quod quid erat esse, et id cujus est. Nec etiam est unum in his quae dicuntur secundum accidens, sicut Socrates et musicus sunt idem per accidens, attendendum est autem quod ab hac sententia quam posuerat, duo hic excepit, scilicet illa quae dicuntur per accidens et substantias materiales, cum superius non exceperit nisi illa quae dicuntur per accidens. Oportet autem non solum ista excludi, sed etiam substantias materiales. Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod quid erat esse est id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem non assignatur individuis, sed speciebus; et ideo materia individualis quae est individuationis principium est praeter id quod est quid erat esse . . ." (*ibid.*, lect. 11). Cf. *ibid.*, lect. 5; *In VIII Metaphys.*, lect. 3; *In III de An.*, lect. 8.

[37]"Quicquid ergo est in re ad naturam communem pertinens, sub significatione essentiae continetur; non autem quicquid est in substantia particulari, est hujusmodi. Si enim quicquid est in substantia particulari ad naturam communem pertineret, non posset esse distinctio inter substantias particulares ejusdem naturae. Hoc autem quod est in substantia particulari praeter naturam communem, est materia individualis quae est singularitatis principium, et per consequens accidentia individualia, quam materiam praedictam determinant. Comparatur ergo essentia ad substantiam particularem ut pars formalius, ut compositis, essentia non est omnino idem quod subjectum; unde non praedicatur de subjecto; non enim dicitur quod Socrates est sua humanitas. In substantiis vero simplicibus nulla est differentia essentiae et subjecti, cum non sit in eis materia individualis naturam communem individuans; sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1). "Sed ista natura sic considerata, quamvis dicat compositum ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac materia demonstrata determinatis accidentis substante, in qua individuatur forma, quia hujusmodi compositum dicit hoc nomen Socrates. Haec autem materia demonstrata est sicut recipiens illam naturam communem" (*In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1). Cf. *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 5.

[38]"In qualibet autem creatura invenitur differentia habentis et habiti. In creaturis namque compositis invenitur duplex differentia; quia ipsum suppositum sive individuum habet naturam speciei, sicut homo humanitatem, et habet ulterius esse . . ." (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 4).

as matter receives form or as substance receives accident. A supposit cannot really have and receive its essence in the way that potency receives and has act. Act is always outside potency and different from it. Essence as a principle of the real cannot be outside the supposit in this way.[39] To consider essence and supposit as act and potency in the real order would, in St. Thomas's view of the history of philosophy, be a repetition of the error of the pre-Socratics who confounded substance with matter. To conceive of the supposit as a real potency for essence is to confuse it with matter, the potency for substantial form.[40] The supposit cannot, then, participate essence as potency participates act, so that the essence and supposit would be distinct as coprinciples in the reality.

The same conclusion must be reached if the very reason for asserting that the supposit is other than the essence in material things is considered. There is a difference in the order of substantial essence between what belongs to man as man and as this man. The reason for the distinction is that common sensible matter is included in the definition of man and individual sensible matter in the individual. The proof is based upon the presence of individual sensible matter in the supposit and not in the essence. The contrast used in the proof cannot then be between essence and supposit in the reality. In the reality there can be only one kind of matter—individual sensible matter. In the essence which is a principle of the supposit the common sensible matter of the definition has to be verified in individual sensible matter. When, therefore, the specific essence is the source of a name which is predicated of the whole existing subject, as when *man* is predicated of *Socrates*, the common matter indicated by the specific essence is always individual sensible matter in the existing subject.[41] Common

[39]". . . quod cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est habens. Habet enim uno modo materia forman suam, et subjectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis; habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est ejus essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est. Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materiam formam, vel subjectum accidens, sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet natura speciei; et similiter est in divinis" (*ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2).

[40]*In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 2; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5; *ST*, I, q. 44, a. 2.

[41]"Impossibile est autem in rerum natura esse speciem nisi in hoc individuo" (*In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 11). "Sicut *homo* non est sine *hoc homine*, ita *materia* non est sine *hac materia*. Quidquid igitur in

sensible matter and intelligible matter must not be conceived as something physically present in the object. Still less, of course, are they a kind of stuff present in the mathematician's or natural philosopher's concepts of the things known. Instead, these names indicate varying references in the abstractions of the human mind to the object from which abstraction has been made. The distinction between essence and supposit said to be true for material things and not for the angels cannot, therefore, exist between essence and supposit in the reality but rather between essence considered as principle of intelligibility and essence as that by which the supposit is distinct. St. Thomas, when speaking more precisely, no longer says that the essence is a formal part or that it is received in individuating matter but rather that it signifies as formal part.[42] In the material thing there is always something really in the essence as supposit that is never explicitly represented in the essence as intelligible. In the order of signification the essence and that of which it is the essence have a role analogous to that of form and matter in the real order. In material things there is a corresponding contrast between the essence as principle of intelligibility and the essence as that by which the supposit is rendered distinct. No such contrast between essence as principle of being and as principle of intelligibility can exist in spiritual beings. The contrast is not that found in a comparison between mental intentions as in logic or of an analysis of real being into its component principles. The contrast is rather between essence as intelligible and the essence identified with the supposit as rendering it distinct.

Summary

It is now necessary to summarize the results obtained. The problem under consideration has been how to reconcile passages where St.

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rebus est subsistens ex materia et forma compositum, est compositum ex forma et materia individuali" (*CG*, II, cap. 50).

[42]". . . humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis, quia principia definitientia habent se formaliter respectu materiae individuantis" (*ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3). "Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui" (*ibid.*, III, q. 2, a. 2). ". . . natura enim significatur per modum formae" (*ibid.*, q. 17, a. 2). Cf. *De Unione*, a. 3.

Thomas affirms the distinction between essence and supposit in the angels with those in which he denies it. The chief difficulty involved consists in understanding how St. Thomas at any stage of his development known to us could identify essence and supposit in any creature. Essence considered as a principle in the existing totality is for him always distinct from the supposit as principle from that of which it is the principle. Considered in another way, however, the individual essence can be identified with the supposit as that by which the supposit is distinct from other supposits. When St. Thomas speaks of the *ratio* of the supposit, or in rational beings of the personality, the reference seems to be to that which renders the supposit distinct, in creatures to the individuated essence. He does not seem to have directly in mind the mode of subsistence as conceived by later thinkers. Though the supposit cannot be conceived without reference to the act by which it exists substantially, this act cannot constitute the supposit without that by which the supposit is rendered distinct. In material beings but not in the angels the individuated essence identical with the supposit as rendering it distinct contains something not found in the essence as principle of intelligibility. In this sense, then, the essence is distinct from the supposit in material things and not in the angels, while at the same time it is true that essence as real principle in the existing totality is distinct from the supposit in all creatures.

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TOWARD A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE: 1900-1955

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The present bibliography does not attempt to exhaust all the books and articles that treat, directly or indirectly, of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite since the turn of the century; it is rather an introductory approach to the major studies in the field. Many standard reference works and patrologies have not been listed, though their bibliographies have been consulted and utilized. Because of their relative importance, a few books and articles antedating the present century have found their way into this compilation. It is hoped that by means of this source-work the profound influence of the *Corpus Dionysianum* on the development of Western thought may become more familiar to Scholastic and non-Scholastic thinkers alike.

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The Order of Recollects of St. Augustine have begun a new journal, *Augustinus*, whose first number was published in January of this year in Madrid; the Editors are Victorino Capánaga and Adolfo Muñoz-Alonzo. The American agent for subscriptions is the Reverend Frank de la Vega, O.R.S.A. (3401 Parallel Ave., Kansas City 2, Kansas); the subscription price is $4.00 a year, $1.25 a copy.

The Guild of Catholic Lawyers of New York held its Third Annual Conference, December 4, 1955. Papers were given by William R. White ("The Natural Law and Commutative Justice"), Miriam T. Rooney ("The Natural Law and Legal Justice"), John C. Fitzgerald ("The Natural Law and Social Justice"), and Edward T. Fagan, Jr. ("The Natural Law and Distributive Justice").

The Sixth Annual Gabriel Richard Lecture was given at Saint Louis University, December 4, 1955, by Professor Anton C. Pegis, of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies; his topic was "Christian Naturalism."

The David F. Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Fund has announced that another fellowship is available for the year 1956-57. In view of the character of the subject matter, a religious interest and a reading knowledge of Danish are required. Persons interested may write the secretary of the committee at the University of Minnesota (106 Wesbrook Hall).

The University of Notre Dame sponsored a symposium on universals, March 9 and 10. Under the chairmanship of Richard McKeon, papers were read by Alonzo Church ("Propositions and Sentences"), Nelson Goodman ("A World of Individuals"), and the Reverend I. M. Bochenski, O.P. ("The Problem of Universals").

The 1956 Aquinas Lecture, sponsored by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University, was presented on March 18, 1956. The Reverend Gerard Smith, S.J., this year's lecturer, spoke on the subject, "The Truth that Frees."

Mount Saint Agnes College (Baltimore) announces an institute of philosophy, to be held, June 25-29, under the direction of the Reverend Gustave Weigel, S.J., on "Religion and the Disciplines." The lectures are "The Realms of Reason and Faith," by the Reverend Dominic Rover, O.P.; "The Religion of Philosophy," by the Reverend Gustave Weigel, S.J.; "Religion and Psychiatry," by Gregory Zilboorg; "Religion and American Sociology," by Will Herbert; and "Religion and Economics," by Josef Solterer.

Are *Apeiria* and *Aoristia* Synonyms?

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Plotinus's manner of using *apeiria*[1] and *aoristia*[2] (and their adjectival forms) is of interest to anyone studying how the Christian notion of divine infinity arose.[3] In one series of texts,[4] where *aoristos* is predicated of evil,

[1]How should *apeiria* be translated? Its etymology (ἀ plus πέρας or πεῖρας) suggests "the state of having no end, limit, boundary." See ἀπειρία in H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Dictionary*, 9 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), I, 184a; also πέρας *ibid.*, II, 1365b. See also H. Guyot, *L'Infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'a Plotin* (Paris: Alcan, 1906), p. 2, where it is shown that any attempt to derive ἀπειρία from πεῖρα (experience) rather than πέρας (limit) is unsatisfactory.

Perhaps we might best translate it as "infinity," which seems to satisfy this etymology and is supported by the almost universal usage of translators. As a proof of this usage, let us briefly investigate how scholars have translated the Greek term in Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius.

Let us first sample some twentieth-century translations of the four sections in which Aristotle *ex professo* treats of *to apeiron* (*Physics* iii. 4-8. 202b30-208a26; *ibid.*, viii. 10. 267b19-27; *Metaphysics* K [XI]. 10. 1066a35-1067a37; *ibid.*, Lambda [XII]. 7. 1073a5-11). Although P. H. Wicksteed (*Aristotle: The Physics*. "Loeb Classical Library." [London: Heinemann, 1929]) occasionally translates *apeiron* in the *loci citati* of the *Physics* by "unlimited" or, even more rarely, by "undetermined," still, he most frequently says "infinite." R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (*Basic Works of Aristotle*. Ed. Richard McKeon. [New York: Random House, 1941]) almost universally use "infinite." As regards the *Metaphysics*, both H. Tredennick (*The Metaphysics*. "Loeb Classical Library." [London: Heinemann, 1933-35]) and W. D. Ross (*Basic Works of Aristotle*) seem almost without exception to use "infinite."

Let us next approach five representative passages in Plotinus on *to apeiron* (*Enneads*, I, 8, 3; V, 7, 1; *ibid.*, 3; VI, 2, 21 and 9, 6). E. Bréhier (*Ennéads* [Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951]) uses "l'infinité" in all but the first text, where he substitutes "l'illimité." Stephen MacKenna (*Enneads of Plotinus* [Boston, Charles T. Branford]) also uses "infinite" (either by itself or together with "limitless" or "boundless") in all but the first, where it is replaced by "unbounded." A. H. Armstrong (*Plotinus* [London: Allen and Unwin, 1953]) and J. Katz (*The Philosophy of Plotinus* [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950]) almost exclusively say "infinite" (although Armstrong's collection, as well as Katz's, contains only three of the texts).

In translating Propositions 84 to 96, which Proclus in his *Elements of Theology* devotes to *apeiria* and *peras*, E. R. Dodds (*The Elements of Theology* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933] always writes "infinite."

Finally, let us look at the following passages in Pseudo-Dionysius's *The Divine Names* (references are to the Greek text in C. Pera's edition of St. Thomas Aquinas's *In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus* [Rome-Turin: Marietti, 1950]): chap. 1, sect. 1, no. 7, sq.; chap. 4, sect. 31, no. 242 and sect. 32, nos. 244-45; chap. 9, sect. 3, no. 365; chap. 11, sect. 1, no. 404 and sect. 5, no. 418; chap. 13,

sect. 3, nos. 449-450. C. D. Chevallier and his collaborators reproduce nine Latin translations of *The Divine Names* (*Dionysiaca*. 2 vols. [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937]). Although one (John Scotus Erigena) translates *apeiria* by "multitudo" or "magnitudo," nevertheless, six, (Robert Grosseteste, Ambrose Traversarius, Marsilius Ficinus, Joachim Périon, P. Lanssel, B. Cordier) universally use "infinitum"; and the other two (Hilduin, John Sarrazin) use it in half of the texts. (See *ibid.*, I, pp. 10-11, 300-3, 307, 456, 497-98, 512, 548-49.) Also M. de Gandillac (*Oeuvres Complètes du Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite* [Paris: Aubier, 1942]) uses "l'infini" in a majority of cases.

In view both of etymology and of tradition, then, "infinite" appears adequately to translate *apeiros*.

[3]How should one translate *aoristia*? According to its etymology (ἀ plus ὅρος), *aoriston* is that which is without boundary, measure, decision, determination, and so on. See ἀοριστία in H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, I, 173b; also see ὅρος, *ibid.*, II, p. 1255d sq. See also H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, Vol. V of *Opera Aristotelis*, ed. Academia Regia Borrusica (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1870), p. 70, where *aoristos* is described as "id quod vel nondum circumscriptum est certis finibus vel non potest certis finibus circumscribi."

How has the word been traditionally translated? Let us turn again to the four Greek authors investigated in Note 1.

From the Aristotelian texts listed by H. Bonitz (see ἀόριστος pp. 70-71), let us select some from both the *Physics* (ii. 5. 196b28; iii. 2. 201b25; iv. 2. 209b9 and 210a8) and the Metaphysics (A [I]. 8. 989b18; Gamma [IV]. 4. 1007b27 sq.; Z [VII]. 11. 1037a27; K [XI]. 6. 1063a28; M [XIII]. 10. 1087a15; N [XIV]. 5. 1092a13). In each of the four translations consulted (those of P. H. Wicksteed, R. P. Hardie-R. K. Gaye, H. Tredennick, W. D. Ross—[see Note 1]), *aoriston* is rendered both by "indefinite" and by "indeterminate," Tredennick alone using "indeterminate" more frequently.

What of the following texts from Plotinus? *Enneads*, I, 8, 3, 1 sq.; *ibid.*, 4, 14 sq.; V, 1, 7, 17 sq.; *ibid.*, 4, 2, 5 sq.; VI, 7, 17, 12 sq.; *ibid.*, 8, 9, 37 sq. E. Bréhier (*Ennéads*) uses "l'illimité" on three occasions, "indéfini" on one, and "indéterminé" on three. S. MacKenna (*Enneads*) uses "indeterminate" in four places, "outside of limits" and "indefinable" or "ever-undefined" each once. J. Katz (*Philosophy of Plotinus*) uses "indeterminate" in the single passage which his collection contains.

E. R. Dodds lists four places in which *aoristos* occurs in Proclus's *Elements of Theology* (*Elements of Theology*, "Index Verborum," p. 324). In all four he translates the word as "indeterminate."

Lastly let us take up the same *loci* in Pseudo-Dionysius as listed in Note 1 (except the first, the Greek MS of which does not contain *aoristia*) and consult the same nine Latin translations furnished by C. D. Chevallier *et al.* in *Dionysiaca*. With the exception of John Scotus Erigena, who universally renders *aoriston* as "infinitum," its translators do not handle it in any uniform fashion. B. Cordier uses "infinitum" twice, "interminatum" twice, "incircumscriptum," "indeterminatum," and "definitionis expers" once each. J. Périon and P. Lanssel offer "interminatum" in three places, "determinationis privatio," "immensum," and "nec definitum" once each. Hilduin uses "infinitum," "interminatum," "indefinitum," and "incertum." J. Sarrazin is similar to Hilduin, except that he has no "incertum." R. Grosseteste uses "interminatum" and "indeterminatum"; A. Traversarius and M. Ficinus, "indeterminatum," "interminatum" and "indefinitum." M. de Gandillac (*Oeuvres de Pseudo-Denys*) expresses it by "indéfini" (under some form or other) on six occasions and "indéterminée" on two.

What does our survey of translations indicate? That no uniform way of translating *aoristos* exists, although "indeterminate" and "indefinite" seem to be the most popular.

If we must choose one word, perhaps

its attempt to know matter, of the One, of the Intelligence, and of the Soul, Plotinus seemingly intends to express an indeterminate condition arising from the non-entity and formlessness which such items involve. Although in another textual group *apeiros* frequently points out the infinite power of the One, of the Intelligence, and of the Soul, still it occasionally

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"indeterminate" (and its related forms) fits best, for it is in harmony with the etymology of *aoristia*, has been rather frequently used by other translators, and clearly expresses what Plotinus's key-text (*Enneads*, v, 1, 7, 17 sq., analyzed later in this article) shows *aoristia* to arise from—an absence of form and determined entity. Of course, if *apeiria* is later shown in certain contexts to be synonymous with *aoristia*, the latter may suitably be expressed by "infinity," just as inversely the former may occasionally be also expressed by "indetermination."

[3]As an introduction to the problem of the Christian conception of God's infinity, see E. Gilson, "L'Infinité divine chez saint Augustin," *Augustinus Magister* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), I, 569-74, especially p. 569.

The problem can easily be discerned if the Middle Ages are seen against Greek antiquity and Holy Scripture. By the thirteenth century almost all theologians were describing God as infinite in His very being. Yet nowhere in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, or Proclus can such a description be found, nor even in the Old and New Testaments. The question is, then, where and how such a doctrine arose. I hope to soon publish a study on divine infinity in St. Thomas Aquinas and, as a background for his commentaries, in Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the *Liber de Causis*.

[4]Textual references will be given later when the series are re-examined. Whenever a text is there reproduced, quotation marks will indicate the reproduction to be a translation. If such marks are absent, the reproduction is shown to be a direct paraphrase.

Throughout the translations and paraphrases, the following transliteration of Greek characters should be noted: the Greek "ζ" has in English become "z"; "ξ" has become "x"; and "χ", "kh."

[5]"All things must come from the One because it is not contained by any form but simply is one, whille Intelligence is all that which is in beings. Consequently, the One is not any of those realities which the Intelligence contains but is the source from which all of them are derived. That is why such realities are entities, for each is determined and has a form. Being cannot pertain to the indeterminate but must be fixed by a determined limit and in a stable condition. For intelligences such stability consists in definition and form, from which they have their existence" (*Enneads*, v, 1, 7, 19 sq.).

Διὸ καὶ οὐσίαι ταῦτα. ὥρισται γὰρ ἤδη καὶ οἷον μορφὴν ἕκαστον ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ὂν δεῖ οὐκ ἐν ἀορίστῳ οἷον θεωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅρῳ πεπῆχθαι καὶ στάσει· στάσις δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁρισμὸς καὶ μορφή, οἷς καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει.

See also VI, 7, 17, 14 sq., quoted in Note 6.

[6]"While gazing at the Good, the Intelligence was indetermined (*aoristos*). Having looked, it became determined even though the Good itself is without determination (. . . *horizeto ekeinou horon ouk ekhontos*). And form (*to eidos*) was in the recipient, whereas that which conferred form was without form (*amorphon*)" (*ibid.*, 7, 12 sq.).

"Do not even remark that the One *is* in such and such a way (*houtós*), because such language would determine (*horisan*) it and make it become a particular thing (*tode ti*). He who beholds it cannot say that it either is or is not such and such, for thereby he would say that it is one of those beings which can rightly be termed such and such, whereas it really is other

describes the same status of nonbeing and absence of form. In still a third series the two words are used together apparently to again express that certain items are without form and being.

The interesting question which such a threefold series suggests is whether the two words are synonyms. Are they simultaneously predicated of the same thing for the same reason? If *apeiros* is aptly translated as "infinite," may *aoristos*, because of its being linked with the former in the third textual series, be similarly translated? When Plotinus terms something *aoriston*, could he also have used *apeiron* without any notable change in signification?

The importance of the question for a student of divine infinity is obvious, since the Greek author seems nowhere to have called his First Principle *apeiron* except with reference to its power. If, however, *apeiria* is in at least certain contexts interchangeable with *aoristia*, to describe the One in its supra-entity as *aoriston* is the same as to call it *apeiron* or "infinite." A twofold doctrine of *apeiria* would then stand revealed, since the word would not only express endless series of effects for which the One is source but also point out the realm of nonbeing in which that First Principle dwells.

How can we best answer that question? Let us briefly re-examine the three lines of texts.

What the first makes clear is that *horos* arises only in something which has a form (*morphē* or *eidos*) and, accordingly, is a being (*on*) or entity (*ousia*). Consequently, an item which is in any degree formless (*amorphon, aneideon*) and nonbeing (*anousion*) is thereby describable as *aoriston*.[5] Thus, the One can without exception be termed *aoriston* to designate that it permanently is above all form and entity.[6] At the nadir of the universe, evil[7] and sensible matter[8] also are universally called *aorista* to indicate that

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than all such beings. Having seen that it is indeterminate (*aoriston*), he can enumerate all the beings which come after it and then say that it is nothing of all of them but that it is total power which is really master of itself" (*ibid.*, 8, 9, 38 sq.).

[7]After discussing how a soul becomes evil by allowing herself to become immersed in matter, Plotinus then concludes: "A perfect soul is always pure because she is turned to the Intelligence and away from matter. Nor does she see or approach that which is entirely indeterminate and unmeasured and evil (*to aoriston . . . kai to ametron kai kakon*). In her purity she remains within the limits (*horistheisa*) fixed by Intelligence. . . . [The wicked soul] is full of indetermination (*aoristias*) . . . and already has matter [by turning towards matter]" (*ibid.*, 1, 8, 4, 14 sq.).

Although the current text is primarily concerned with matter, still it also has to do with evil, since matter and evil seem identical (see *ibid.*, 3, 20-40 and 4, 1 sq.).

[8]Since matter is an indeterminancy (*aoristia*) and since one knows like by like, one should perceive the indeterminate by the indeterminate (*to aoristo to aoriston*). What then is that indetermination of the soul (*he aoristia tes psykhes*)? It is not a complete ignorance or a total absence of knowledge, but rather some-

of themselves they are below all form and being. To the extent that an individual soul turns aside from true reality in an effort to know matter[9] or to immerse itself in wickedness,[10] it also is to be designated as *aoriston*. Finally, the Intelligence and the Soul achieve form and entity only by turning back to their respective sources.[11] In the atemporal interval prior

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thing positive—the obscurity which results

Also *ibid.*, 6, 14 sq. Elements (*ta stoikheia*) are composed of form (*eidos*) when the soul removes from a sensible object its form, which is as light. That obscurity is matter (*ibid.*, II, 4, 10, 1 sq.). and of matter. The form of each gives quality and shape (*ten morphen*), whereas matter is the indeterminate substrate of form, precisely because it itself is not a form (*kata to hypokeimenon aoriston hoti me eidos*). See also *ibid.*, 13, 26 sq.

Intelligible matter, too, is called *aoriston*. "If the intelligible universe is multiple yet indivisible, then that multiplicity-in-unity has matter as its unity: since its multiplicity is that of forms, its unity is conceivable only as diversified by a plurality of forms (*morphai*)—without that diversity, its unity would be without form (*amorphon*). Mentally take away that diversity of forms, of *logoi*, of intelligibles, and what remains is formless and indetermined (*amorphon kai aoriston*); namely, intelligible matter" (*ibid.*, 4, 7 sq.).

Is intelligible matter eternal? Yes, as eternal as the Ideas and the intelligible world itself, for, as the principle of matter and of motion, intelligible otherness (*he heterotes*) eternally produces matter. Movement, otherness [and matter] are indetermined (*aoriston*) and come from the First, which they need in order to be defined (*to horisthenai*) and which they achieve by turning towards the One. Before that turning, matter and otherness are indetermined (*aoriston*) and deprived of goodness and light (*ibid.*, 5, 24 sq.).

See also *ibid.*, 2, 2 sq., where the following objection is lodged against positing matter in the intelligibles: Since matter is that which is indetermined and without form (*aoriston, amorphon*) and since indetermination and formlessness cannot be in such excellent beings, matter itself is not to be found there. Plotinus answers (*ibid.*, 3, 1 sq.) by warning against contemning that which is indetermined and formless (*to aoriston . . . amorphon*), since even the soul is such until it acheives form (*eidos*) by turning to the Intelligence.

[9]See *ibid.*, 10, 1 sq., partially paraphrased in Note 8, first paragraph.

[10]See *ibid.*, I, 8, 4, 14 sq., quoted in Note 7, first paragraph.

[11]For a broad sketch of how the Intelligence and the Soul are produced and achieve being by such reversion, see *ibid.*, V, 2, 1, 1 sq., and 1, 7, 1 sq.

[12]On the Intelligence, see *ibid.*, 4, 2, 4 sq.: "Thought is the act of an intelligence. But the thought which sees the intelligible [here: the Good] and which is turned towards, and receives its completion from, that intelligible is itself indetermined (*aoristos*) as is vision and is made definite (*horizomene*) only by that intelligible."

Also *ibid.*, VI, 7, 17, 12 sq., quoted in Note 6.

On the Soul, see *ibid.*, V, 1, 7, 36 sq. "Intelligence because perfect begets the Soul. It must beget because it is perfect and, being so great a power, it cannot remain sterile. Even here the begotten cannot be better, which had to be inferior, since she was an image of the Intelligence. Moreover, since she was indeterminate (*aoriston*) by herself, she had to be determined and formed (*horizomenon . . . kai eidopoioumenon*)."

[13]"The One is the greatest of all things, not by physical magnitude but in power, for that which is without extension is great through power (so, too, the beings which come after it are indivisible and without parts with reference to their powers and not to their mass). We must also insist that it is infinite (*apeiron*) not as though intraversible either in extension or in number but through the fact that its power cannot be comprehended" (*ibid.*, VI, 9, 6, 7 sq.). "Nor is it infinite as a quantity

to that reversion, they too are termed *aorista* in their formlessness and non-being.[12]

By way of conclusion, then, we may state that in such contexts *aoristia* seems always to indicate the indetermination resulting from an absence of form and entity.

What information can be harvested from the second textual area? Plotinus frequently predicates *apeiron* of power. For instance, he carefully emphasizes that the One is the greatest (*to megiston*) of all things—not, indeed, through physical magnitude, but in its infinite (*apeiron*) power, which can never be found wanting and is the ultimate source of absolutely everything.[13] The power of the Intelligence, too, is affirmed to be *apeiron*, for, like a unique *logos* and a one-many, it is huge, perfect, and all-inclusive.[14] Why, finally, should one conceive of the Soul as omnipresent in the cosmos? Because its power is infinite (*apeiron*) and, thereby, embraces the entire span of reality.[15]

Apeiron, then, often indicates that the power of the One, of the *Nous* and of the Soul is infinite—each in its own way is the fount of an infinite cascade of effects (or, at least, of infinitely recurring cycles of the same effects).

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would be, for where would it have to extend? Of what could accrue to that which needs nothing? But its power has infinity, for it can never be found wanting, since beings which are adequate *are* through it" (*ibid.*, v, 5, 10, 18 sq.). "That which is thus capable of making all things, what greatness would it have? It would be infinite (*apeiron*) and, if so, would have no physical magnitude. For such magnitude is found in the things which come after it, and if it will produce their magnitude, then it itself should not be extended. The greatness of an entity is not quantitative; only that which is after entity would have such magnitude. The Principle would be great in this sense that nothing is more powerful than it or even equally so" (*ibid.*, vi, 7, 32, 14 sq.).

That the One is the source of absolutely everything, see *ibid.*, v. 1, 7, 19 sq., and 2, 1, 1 sq., and so on.

[14]"So, too, there is an infinity (*to apeiron*) in the Intelligence because it is one-many, not after the manner of a house but of a *logos* which embraces a multiplicity in itself" (*ibid.*, vi, 7, 14, 11 sq.).

This tremendous Intelligence which is all things, which contains all that proceeds from it, ". . . is a one-many, and the many are its powers, wonderful powers, not weak, but, because they they are pure, the greatest of powers, fresh and full of life and truly powers, without any limit to their action. So there we see the infinite, infinity and greatness (*apeiron . . . kai apeiria kai to mega*)" (*ibid.*, 2, 21, 1 sq.). Later: "The Intelligence has all things in its power and has them as beings and as an Intelligence should possess them. It has them inasmuch as they are in a Mind, but not in a discursive one. It omits nothing of which there is a *logos;* in fact, it itself is, as it were, a unique *logos*, which is huge, perfect, and all inclusive. . ." See also *ibid.*, vi, 5, 4, 13-17 and *ibid.*, 6, 1 sq.; *ibid.*, iv, 4, 9, 13 sq.; *ibid.*, v, 8, 9, 14 sq.

[15]How is the Soul present? "As one life, for life in a living thing does not extend to a particular point beyond which it cannot advance to the whole but is everywhere. If anyone again wants to know *how*, he should remember its power. It is not just so much, but if you go on mentally dividing it to infinity (*eis apeiron*), it

Nevertheless, the word on occasion points out also a status of formlessness and nonbeing, as when intelligible matter, which is elsewhere described as the recipient and substrate of forms precisely because it is itself entirely without form,[16] is classified as *apeiron*.[17] Or, again, the term is similarly used when evil, which has *apeiria* and *ametria* seemingly because of its

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has always the same power, fundamentally infinite (*apeiron*), for it has no matter in itself to make it diminish along with the size of the body's bulk" (*ibid.*, VI, 5, 12, 1 sq.).

"The same Soul suffices for all bodies, because that Soul contains all souls and all intelligences. It is both one and infinite (*apeiron*) and has all things together; if each soul is there distinguished from others, that distinction is not a separation. How is that unique Soul infinite (*apeiron*)? One can call it infinite because it simultaneously contains everything—all life, all soul, and all intelligence . . . The Soul ought not have merely a single life but an infinite number of them, and yet it does have a single one, too—not single as though they all were piled together and thus united but because all spring from, and remain in, a single source" (*ibid.*, 4, 14, 1 sq.). See also *ibid.*, 5, 9, 31 sq. and 11, 8 sq.

[16]Since the Ideas are multiple, each must have that which is properly its own—its form (*morphe*)—and that which is common to all—matter. Hence, if there is form there is also that which is formed and differentiated; namely, matter, which receives form and always underlies it. (*ibid.*, II, 4, 4, 1 sq.).

Later in the same text we are told that when intelligibles are mentally divested of forms and *logoi*, what remains is formless and indetermined (*amorphon kai aoriston*); namely, intelligible matter (*ibid.*, 1, 7 sq., paraphrased in Note 8, third paragraph).

[17]"In the intelligibles, matter is also the infinite (*to apeiron*) and is brought forth from the infinity (*ek tes . . . apeirias*) of the One—either from that of its power or of its eternity. The One itself is not infinite (*apeirias*) but is infinite only in its activity. But how, you ask, can matter be infinite both in the intelligible and in the sensible universe? Because infinity (*to apeiron*) is twofold" (*ibid.*, 15, 17 sq.). Plotinus then explains that intelligible matter is less infinite than sensible matter, for "as an item moves away from being and truth, so does it become a weaker image and more truly infinite (*mallon apeiron*)" (*ibid.*, 1, 21 sq.).

If our interpretation is correct, in such passages one can substitute "the indetermined" for "the infinite" without any change of meaning.

[18]"The contrary of being is nonbeing (*ousia . . . me ousia*); the contrary of the nature of the Good, the nature and principle of Evil. For if there are two principles, the one is that of goods; the other, that of evils. Each of the characteristics which the one nature has is contrary to those of the other . . . The limit, measure (*peras, metron*). and other characteristics which are in the divine nature are contrary to the infinity and unmeasuredness (*apeiria kai ametria*) and other properties of the nature of evil . . . This latter has only false being (*to einai de pseudomenon*) and is, primarily and essentially, a deception. The other has true being (*to alethos einai*)" (*ibid.*, I, 8, 6, 32 sq.).

In *ibid.*, VI, 7, 32, 24 sq., love of the One is termed *apeiros* precisely because the object loved is indetermined (*ou . . . horistai*): "That object of desire, whose figure or form no one can capture, is all the more desirable and lovable, and love of Him is measureless (*ametros*), for love here is without determination (*ou . . . horistai*) and, thus, the love itself is infinite (*apeiros*). His beauty is of another sort, for He is beyond beauty. Since He is not a being, what sort of ordinary beauty could He have?"

[19]*Ibid.*, I, 8, 3, 1 sq.

See also *ibid.*, II, 4, 15, 1 sq. Infinity and indetermination (*to apeiron kai to aoriston*) do not belong merely accidentally

false being (*to einai de pseudomenon*), is contrasted with the *peras, metron* and true being (*to alēthōs einai*) of the divine nature.[18]

What, then, does this second series of texts reveal? That *apeiria* has two distinct meanings. It signifies either the infinity of power which the three Plotinian hypostases enjoy or an indetermination consequent upon an absence of *eidos* and *morphē*. In this latter signification does it not seem synonymous with the *aoristia* displayed in the first line of passages?

This synonymity is placed beyond question by the third group, in which the two words are simultaneously predicated of the same things for the same reason. As an example of such predication consider what Plotinus says concerning evil. Since *to kakon*, he begins, is neither in beings nor in that which is beyond being, it must be classed among nonbeings—existing, in fact, as a sort of form of nonbeing (*eidos to tou mē ontos*). Thus one can conceive evil as measurelessness opposed to measure, as the infinite opposed to limit, as formlessness opposed to a forming principle (*ametrian pros metron kai apeiron pros peras kai aneideon pros eidopoiētikon*), as the eternally deficient opposed to self-sufficiency. It is always indetermined (*aoriston*), never stable, affected by everything, insatiable, utterly poor. Such are not its accidental properties but, as it were, its very entity (*ousia*). There necessarily is, then, an Infinity-in-itself and a Formlessness-in-itself (*apeiron kath'auto kai aneideon au auto*).[19]

Necessarily, also, do *to apeiron* and *to aoriston* seem, with little or no change in meaning, to refer to the same indetermination or limitlessness or infinitude in evil, consequent upon its lack of formal reality.

If we link this last line of texts with the previous two, what composite picture do we see? First of all, *aoristia* signifies that the item of which it is predicated is without determination (*horos*) because it is without form. On the other hand, *apeiria* can point to the same absence of determination and form, as well as express an infinity of power. In its first meaning, then, the word is interchangeable with *aoristia*. Consequently, when Plotinus characterized the One in its hyperentitative condition as *aoriston*, he could also have said *apeiron* without any deviation in meaning.

As an epilogue, let us ask whether this interpretation of *aoristia* as occasionally synonymous with *apeiria* is confirmed by texts in Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius, each of whom might be expected to have been influenced by Plotinus. Manifestly, yes. *Apeiria*, Proclus informs us, is applicable not only to an unfailing power,[20] to every sort of perpetuity, to the endlessness

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to matter, as is clear from the following consideration. All number and *logoi* are outside *apeiria* inasmuch as from them beings receive their limits and order (*horoi . . . taxeis*). Since that which is ordered is other than that which orders (namely, limit, determination and reason—*to peras kai horos kai logos*), neces-

of quantity and bulk but, significantly, also to matter in the indetermination of its very nature (*to aoriston tēs ousias*) and in its formlessness.[21] Again, every manifold of beings is immersed in *aoristia* and *apeiria* until it achieves measure, determination (*horos*), formation, and true entity through the unifying influence of the gods.[22]

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sarily that which is ordered and determined (*to tattomenon kai horizomenon*) is that which is infinite (*to apeiron*). But that which is ordered is matter, which thereby is infinite, not as if infinity only contingently belonged to it—matter *is* infinity itself. (*οὐ τοίνον συμβεβηκὸς τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἄπειρον· αὐτὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἄπειρον*).

[20]"All true being is infinite (*apeiron*) neither in number nor in size but only in power" (E. R. Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 86, p. 79). In fact, an infinity of power indicates in every being a composition of *peras* and *apeiron* (*ibid.*, Prop. 89, p. 83). In virtue of the principle that "prior to the characters of individuals there must subsist these characters in themselves as universal and originative causes," Proclus posits that "prior to all that is composed of limit and infinity (*ek peratos kai apeirias*) there must exist substantially and independently the First Limit and the First Infinity (*to proton peras kai to protos apeiron*)" (*ibid.*, Prop. 90, p. 83).

[21]"All perpetuity is a kind of infinitude (*apeiria*), but not all infinitude (*apeiria*) is perpetuity.

"For of things infinite (*ton apeiron*) many have this attribute in a sense other than that of perpetuity—as the infinitude (*apeiria*) of quantity and of bulk, and the infinitude of matter (*he tes hyles apeiria*) and the like, which are infinite because they cannot be enumerated or traversed or else by the indetermination of their being (*dia to aoriston tes ousias*)" (*ibid.*, Prop. 94, p. 85).

See also *In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria* (*Opera Inedita*, ed. Victor Cousin. [Paris: Durand, 1864], col. 1119, 11. 4-8): "To begin with, then, let us look at infinity (*ten apeirian*) in matter, which is, of itself, indetermined, shapeless and formless (*aoristos kath hauten kai amorphos kai aneideos*), whereas the forms and shapes of matter are its limits (*ta de eide kai hai morphai perata tes hyles*)."

One should note, however, that Proclus later asserted beings are made up of form and intelligible matter only if one understands by the latter "infinite power" and not some shapeless, formless, and indetermined (*aneideon, aoriston*) nature. (*Platonic Theology*. Greek text with Latin trans. by Aemilius Portus [Hamburg: Michael Heringus, 1618], pp. 137-38.)

[22]"Every God is a measure of things existent. For if every god has the character of unity, he defines (*aphorizei*) and measures all the manifolds of existent things. For all manifolds are in their own nature indeterminate but receive determination (*aorista . . . horizetai*) through unity; and that which has the character of unity tends to measure and limit (*peratoun*) the subjects in which it is present and by its virtue to bring the indefinite to definition (*eis horon*). By participation in it even the indefinite acquires a unitary form (that is to say, it loses its indetermination or infinitude—*tes aoristias te kai apeirias*); and the more it is unified through form (*henoeides*), the less is it indeterminate or measureless (*aoriston kai ametron*). Thus every manifold of existent things is measured by the divine henads" (*Elements of Theology*, Prop. 117, pp. 103, 105). See also *ibid.*, Prop. 93, p. 85.

[23]". . . no being completely falls from unity [which Divine Peace effects], for what is totally unstable, infinite (*apeiron*), inconstant and indeterminate (*aoriston*) is neither a being nor in beings [that is, as an attribute of beings]" (*The Divine Names*, chap. 11, sect. 5, no. 418).

The two words occur together in Dionysius's discussion of evil: "The cause of goods is unique. If evil is the contrary of good, then the causes of the former are

No less clearly do *aoristia* and *apeiria* continue to be synonymous in Pseudo-Dionysius, for whom the two terms can simultaneously be predicated both of creatures and of God. What is completely unstable and infinite (*apeiron*), he warns, as well as inconstant and indeterminate (*aoriston*), is neither a being nor in beings.[23] In fact, divine conservation aims at preventing things, once set up in their determined and unique natures, from passing over into infinity and indetermination (*pros to apeiron kai aoriston*) and, eventually, nonbeing by becoming disordered and unstable.[24] On the other hand, God Himself is described by the inspired writers as invisible, infinite (*apeiron*), and incomprehensible, who thereby signify not what He is but rather what He is not. Such negative descriptions are justly offered, for we are ignorant of His supraentitative (*hyperousion*), inconceivable, and ineffable *aoristia*.[25]

Although Proclus and the Pseudo-Areopagite may differ from Plotinus on other doctrinal points,[26] still is it not clear, in the light of the previous texts, that for all three *aoristia* and *apeiria* are synonymous as often as the latter term is linked with formlessness and non-entity?

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multiple. That which effects evils is not designs (*logoi*) and powers, but rather a lack of power, weakness and a disharmonious mixture of heterogeneous factors. Consequently, evils are not stable or immobile, nor do they run a consistent course, but they are infinite and indeterminate and are borne from subject to subject, which too are infinite in number (. . . *apeira kai aorista . . . toutois apeirois*)" (*ibid.*, chap. 4, sect. 31, no. 242).

[24]"Divine peace . . . defines (*horizei*) everything, sets limits (*peratoi*) to each, and establishes each, nor does it allow things so distinguished and set apart to pass over into the infinite and indetermined (*pros to apeiron kai aoriston*) by becoming disordered, unstable or abandoned by God, or disunited within itself or mixed up with others" (*ibid.*, chap. 11, sect. 1, no. 404).

[25]"Although the inspired writers describe the superessential (*hyperousiou*) Deity in such fitting terms as Reason, Intelligence, Being (*ousian*), the really real Reality (*ontos ousan hyparxis*), Cause, Light, Life . . . nevertheless they also use images which do not resemble God in any fashion, for they call Him invisible, infinite (*apeiron*) and incomprehensible, thereby signifying not what He is but what He is not (*ou ti estin alla ti ouk esti*). And this latter way is more suitable . . . because we may justly say that He is nothing of that which creatures are, while we are ignorant of His super-essential, inconceivable and ineffable Indetermination (*ten hyperousion . . . aoristian*)" (*Celestial Hierarchy*, chap. 2, sect. 3, [*PG* 140D-141A]).

[26]On Proclus, see E. R. Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, "Proclus and his Predecessors," pp. xviii-xxvi; A. H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* (London: Methuen, 1947), chap. 18, "The Later Neo-Platonists," pp. 197-204; Thomas Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of Hellenism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1918), pp. 107-57; L. Rosan, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York: Cosmos, 1949), *passim*.

As an introduction to the main lines of Pseudo-Dionysius's thought, consult M. de Gandillac, *Oeuvres du Pseudo-Denys*, pp. 7-64; Etienne Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge*, (Paris: Payot, 1947), pp. 80-95; Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 81-85.

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dismiss the libertarian and deterministic positions and concentrate on the value of punishment as a deterrent and corrective. Moral responsibility, he asserted, is irrelevant to punishment. Terence Penelhum (University of Alberta) gave a good analysis of pleasure from the semantic point of view, treating the expressions of the pleasure concept, rather than the reality itself. Though he did not refer to Aristotle, his treatment was not too far from the *Ethics*, in that he saw pleasure as a form of awareness or attention which would be an incidental accompaniment of other activities.

In "The Autonomy of Morals," David Rynin (University of California) used the language of symbolic logic to give a scholarly analysis of the fallacy that ethical demonstrations pass from factual premises to normative conclusions. Ethical demonstrations are to be justified, not by latent normative propositions implicit in factual premises, but by the fact that people do accept ethical judgments. If modern logic cannot at present justify ethical reasoning, this logic must be broadened until it can.

The history of modern philosophy was not neglected. Charles H. Monson, Jr. (University of Nevada), in asking "Is Locke Really a Hobbesian?", maintained Locke's natural law position against Strauss's contention that Locke was really a Hobbesian egoist. John S. Linnell (Sacramento State College) defended the consistency of Berkeley's thought from his earlier *Principles* through the *Siris*. Professor J. H. Faurot showed that "common sense" had a special meaning for Thomas Reid and that, though the concept degenerated with its later exaggerated application, much can be said for its earlier usage. Fredrick Sontag (Pomona College) traced the decline of British ethical theory from 1903 to 1951 in an excellent paper. He pointed out how G. E. Moore's attempt to clarify ethical notions before going on to give some direction to conduct has led to a complete abdication from this latter function in contemporary British writing, and in its place there is only a concentration on the epistemology of moral knowledge with its stress on logical analysis and methodology.

The business meeting presented an interesting example of the application of principles to practical situations in a well-argued debate on a motion criticizing the authorities at Reed College for their dismissal of Professor Stanley Moore, after he had refused to reply to the Velde Committee's questions and those of the Board of Trustees of the College as to whether or not he had been a member of the Communist Party. The motion was passed with division and with a number of abstentions from voting. Professor David Rynin was chosen president, and Barnett Savery (University of British Columbia) continues as secretary-treasurer.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

La Philosophie comme science rigoureuse. By Edmund Husserl. Introduction, French translation, and commentary by Quentin Lauer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. Pp. 199. Fr. 600.

Phénoménologie de Husserl; Essai sur la genèse de l'intentionnalité. By Quentin Lauer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. Pp. xvi + 441. Fr. 1,200.

The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry. By J. H. van den Berg. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1955. Pp. ix + 105. $3.00.

Father Lauer's two Sorbonne theses mark a definite step forward in Husserl scholarship. The shorter work is a translation of Husserl's famous article in *Logos*, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911). This essay held a critical position in Husserl's development, since it marked the transition from the restricted analyses of logical problems in *Logical Investigations* to the fuller treatment of phenomenological principles in *Ideas, Part I.* The purpose of the *Logos* article was to affirm Husserl's conviction about the scientific nature of philosophy and to indicate the means to be followed for carrying out this ideal. Since the work is brief, relatively simple in presentation, and fairly comprehensive of the main themes in phenomenology, it makes a good introduction for those who want to study Husserl at first hand.

Husserl gives here a concentrated version of his notable polemic against psychologism or the naturalizing of consciousness and its ideas by Mill and empiricism. Although he recognizes a valid place for scientific psychology and the psychophysical method, he rejects the claim that they provide the sole, properly philosophical method of studying psychic life. But if the defect of psychologism is to absolutize one approach to man, the opposite extreme is to regard all views as equally valid and also equally confined to some given age. Husserl's critique of cultural relativism and historicism retains its value today. He points out the difference between a purely cultural evaluation and a scientific resolution of an issue. Dilthey's theory of world-outlooks does give a certain artistic and practical unity, but it provides no way for determining the scientific and philosophic

validity of the elements entering into a cultural outlook. Husserl defends the ideal of philosophy as a strictly scientific discipline, while offering his own conception of what makes speculation to be scientific. He advocates a constant effort at making new beginnings in the study of problems, leading to an inspection of things in their objective being in consciousness.

The present French translation is enhanced by an introduction and a detailed commentary in the form of notes. The introduction has the beginner in mind. It summarizes the *Logos* article and clarifies such key notions as objectivity, truth, the return to beginnings, and the ideal of communal research. The commentary makes judicious use of Husserl's entire corpus of published and unpublished writings, as well as the results of recent scholarship. There are some concise but illuminating comparisons of Husserl with Kant, Hegel, and Brentano. Husserl's position on intuition, metaphysics, givenness of things, and empathy is analyzed in some detail (although no use is made of Edith Stein's book on empathy). Even for the student who can follow the German text, this edition is a reliable aid that should be consulted.

For his major dissertation, Lauer concentrated on the central notion of intentionality. This is a good choice, both for understanding Husserl and for facilitating comparison with the existentialist and realist meanings for intentionality. As the subtitle indicates, a genetic approach is taken. A theory of intentionality became increasingly important for Husserl, as a means of realizing his ideal of philosophy as rigorous science. Its scientific character can only be assured by absolute knowledge; that is, by endowing philosophy with the absolute truth about being. Whatever the relative modes of being may be, Husserl was convinced that the only absolute reality of being is its meaning in and for consciousness. To avoid arbitrary subjectivism, however, this absolute manner of being must also retain its objectivity and transcendence of consciousness. This is somewhat similar to the realist way of viewing the problem of knowledge, except for the decisive fact that Husserl identified the definitive act of being with its act-of-being-for-consciousness. Hence he did not treat intentionality realistically, as a way of conforming the intellect with the principles of being as actually present in the existing thing. Rather, he regarded intentionality as the means whereby the transcendental self constitutes the objectivity or meaningfulness of the object, taken precisely as a phenomenon for and in consciousness. Intentionality is an operation of pure consciousness constituting the being in its absolute reality and evidence as an object. Husserl went beyond Kant in this respect, since he extended the intentional operation to the material as well as the formal aspects of true, objective being. Intentionality is a wholly immanent activity, enabling the subject to con-

stitute the entire objective reality of a being, insofar as it is philosophically significant. This leaves aside the question of creating the contingent, factual condition of empirical things.

Lauer traces the growth of the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality through his major published books. He gives a synthetic view of this theme as developed in *Logical Investigations, Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic,* and *Cartesian Meditations,* with frequent references to the materials in the Husserl archives at Louvain. He underlines the metaphysical, yet radically nonrealistic, character of this *operational-constitutive* theory of intentionality. For it rests upon a total rationalization of being, experience, and the meaning of objectivity. Lauer's own critique is very discreetly expressed and resolutely confined to an immanent appraisal. The main points are that Husserl simply supposes the complete competence of reason alone to reach absolute truth and that he narrows down the philosophical method too exclusively to the phenomenological one. This is logical enough, once we assume that the only meaningful reality for philosophy is that of the meaning-filled phenomenal essence or being-for-consciousness. But the precise point which should not be assumed so uncritically is that philosophy has no interest in the contingent act of being as such and that the latter affords no philosophically relevant evidence and truth. A certain insensitivity to the philosophical import of the history of philosophy rendered Husserl incapable of remaining open to the realist approach to being, truth, and certitude.

It is notoriously easier to speak about Husserl in French than in English. We may hope that Lauer will do something soon toward removing the roadblock by making Husserl publishable and readable in English. Apart from Farber's paraphrase of Husserl's earlier positions and a few stray articles, there are as yet no reliable guides in our language. The task is all the more urgent at present, because of the extremely loose way in which some realists in the United States are appealing to "*the* phenomenological method of intentionality." It is historically confusing to refer vaguely to Brentano and Husserl as the restorers of intentionality, and then proceed to use intentionality in a way quite opposed to Husserl's. And it is systematically misleading to label the descriptive phase of a realist theory of knowledge "phenomenological" without appending a careful critique of what Husserl meant by the intentional presence of essences to the mind and the intentional constitution of objects of consciousness. Since Husserl's notion of otherness and objectivity is integral with his transcendental idealism, greater care should be exercised by those realists who make modish reference to the results of phenomenological analysis of knowledge.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that some existentialists and psychiatrists employ a phenomenological method which omits Husserl's

essential doctrine on the constituting activity of the transcendental subject. Dr. van den Berg's book is an instructive example of this other usage, as it functions in one type of psychopathology. The case-history method is used to show how a new psychiatric analysis can be organized around the themes of man's relations to the world, the body, fellow man, and time. The descriptive technique used here is closely allied with the existentialist descriptions of Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre. The author also reviews the history of his method, stressing the contributions of Ludwig Binswanger and Husserl. Significantly, the debt to Husserl is confined to his teaching on the direct intuitive insight into other persons, without utilizing the stages of reduction or the transcendental subject.

The prudent thing would seem to be to call a halt to the indiscriminate mention of the phenomenological method, on the part of realists. There are several technical meanings for this method in contemporary philosophy, and not all of them are reconcilable with a realist theory of knowledge. The meaning of "descriptive technique" and "intentionality" is not uniformly established, and the preliminary work of distinguishing and evaluating the conflicting interpretations is still in progress.

WILLIAM L. ROSSNER, S.J. *Creighton University*

The Meaning of Love: An Essay towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity. **By Robert O. Johann, S.J. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1955. Pp. viii + 133.**

This first book (of many, one hopes) from a talented mind is welcome, both for what it is and for the further discussions it invites.

Its subject, love, though comparatively neglected in modern philosophy's preoccupation with knowledge, has been considered by many the summary of the law and wisdom. Its well selected footnotes, bibliography, and index offer a good introduction to work that has been done in the field, particularly by Scholastics and French writers. Its text, however, is not just another display of exegetical virtuosity but rises to an illuminated and illuminating personal speculation.

Fr. Johann proposes an answer to the question: "What is the meaning of love?" (p. 3) "Our aim is to examine the reality itself, to search out the very nature of love, its ontological structure, its situation and import in the realm of being" (p. 4). Assistance is accepted mainly from two sources considered mutually complementary: contemporary thought, such as that of

phenomenologists, of Madinier, Marcel, Nédoncelle; and Thomistic metaphysics.

Contemporaries are viewed as supplying a deficiency of Thomism by their approach to being from within. In the inwardness of human consciousness the absolute incommunicable presence of the self to the self is experienced, a reality resisting objectification in concepts. Such subjectivity and interiority are necessary for a philosophy of love, for love terminates, not like knowledge in reality objectified within the knower, but in the beloved as subject in its own inner mystery. Love is an extension of the inward presence of being to itself—an experience of intersubjectivity. Because these contemporaries, however, lack a unified understanding of the whole of reality, the "key to understanding love lies, we think, in a synthesis of Thomist thought, as furnishing a metaphysical framework for a *philosophy* of intersubjectivity, with the insights of contemporaries into the *mystery* of intersubjectivity" (p. 9).

The basic framework is St. Thomas's distinction between *amor concupiscentiae*, here called "desire," and *amor amicitiae*, called "direct love." These are involved in love as willing good to someone: desire of the good as for someone beyond this term itself; and a direct love of that someone (self or other) as a good willed for itself. These loves and correlative terms are irreducible and analogous.

Desire terminates in the real only as *taleity*, as a nature by which a subject is perfected. It is functional and abstracts from the existential uniqueness of its term. Its good even as Separated means the perfective by assimilation, necessarily relative (Ch. I and IV).

The dominant direct love, however, terminates in being as *ipseity*, as exercising a unique act of existence—as act confronting act. One directly loves a distinct subsisting person for itself, but as one's own self. This radical realism raises the problem: How can this good as formally exterior be one's own good? (Ch. I)

The antinomy is resolved by similitude and participation (Ch. II). Direct love of every being for itself is basic and primary, the archetype; but the other is similar to the beloved self; and therefore the other is good and beloved. This similarity is not just that of the immanent analogical *ratio* but also and formally a community in ipseity, a communion of uniques in uniqueness, because each participates in, i.e., has a relation of similitude to and dependence upon, the One Absolute Being and Value. "It is the presence of this Value in the creature that is the creature" (p. 30).

This Good of both self and other is attained as such only by persons (Ch. III). Only an *I* is conscious of and loves an ineffable, incommunicable self as present and as value. The other becomes a second self, a *Thou*, by

dialogue and mutual exchange. In this reciprocal communion I fathom the depths of my own Value transcending self. The deepest exigency of my own being is to break the limit of my proper nature and exist for another. The Absolute Good which terminates direct love is "Self-giving Subsistence."

Once distinguished, these loves are synthesized (Ch. v). Direct love is not actual in a creature from the beginning but demands desire of itself; and the deepest desire in the creature as taleity is for direct love's generosity.

Fr. Johann's thought stimulates further discussion. His appeals to St. Thomas (like those of previous writers, who have quoted St. Thomas at times in support of conflicting views) arouse a desire for a synthetic survey of St. Thomas's complete thought on love. Fr. Johann's chief interest really focuses on the nature of the good and of friendship. A further investigation of the characteristics distinguishing love itself (whether direct love or desire) from both friendship and the good (*Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 3 and a. 4 ad 1; q. 27, a. 1) and also those intrinsically differentiating natural, sense, and intellectual love would be interesting and helpful in unraveling difficulties (*ibid.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 2 ad 2). Even the traditional accepting of self-love as the archetype and positing the problems from that perspective might prove to be not the only fruitful approach, for if the nature of love ultimately turns out to be an inclination to another, perhaps by simply admitting that at once one could avoid the necessity of a metamorphosis of self into another.

LINUS J. THRO, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Maritain on the Nature of Man in a Christian Democracy. **By Norah Willis Michener. Preface by Anton C. Pegis. Hull, Canada: Editions "L'Eclair," 1955. Pp. xiii + 149. $4.25.**

This volume is not a labored dissection of a systematic political anthropology nor an abstract analysis of a brilliant intellectualistic doctrine. Rather, it is a warm and deferential yet thoroughly documented entry into the mind and heart of an outstanding Christian philosopher. The author presents Maritain's half-century of dedication to truth in an admirably integrated selection of his views from most of his works. A fairly simple pattern of exposition is made feasible by the organizing theme: the implications of man's rational nature for the perfection of his life in modern political society. The problems which were to be Maritain's lifelong concern beset him already in his formative years as a student of the sciences at the

Sorbonne: Must one rest content with the approximations and the relativism of science, or is it possible to find satisfying answers to man's unending and urgent demand for absolutes? What is the nature of man that even in a day of dissolution and despair he is sure he is not meant for this? Confidence in reason and convictions about it are strengthened in Maritain by his study under Bergson, whose own intellectualism plays its part in forming his mind. Yet the constitutive evolutionism and mysticism in Bergson's thought deceive Maritain's hopes; moving as he does between these two irrationalist poles, Bergson is unable to provide a rational explanation of man's place in reality or a stable pattern for moral and religious life. But Maritain is especially confirmed in his convictions from the days of his conversion to the Catholic faith. He anchors his thought on human rationality in the Thomistic tradition, but with entire freedom of spirit he works over what he finds there and develops it and exploits it in his own way; for "what concerns us in a philosophy is not that it be Christian, but that it be true" (p. 20). He builds a metaphysical philosophy of the person—rational, free, responsible—and grounds in it his defense both of the rights and dignity of man and of his reasonable subjection to duly constituted authority. In this doctrine of the human person he finds the only hope of a sound reconstruction of the social and political order.

The author succeeds in laying hold of the thought of Maritain at its most profoundly right and most meaningful for the contemporary mind. This theocentric humanism is Maritain's prescription for secularized man, grown gray and hopeless in the intellectual twilight of technocracy and militarism. Full human freedom and the integrity of the human person can be achieved, he tells us, only in a society which will have regard not only for the qualified autonomy of man's intellectual nature but for the divine guarantor of human dignity upon whom man and society depend. Hence, in defending the prerogatives of human rationality and in attaching the personal and social perfection of man to his rational nature, Maritain would not permit one to lose sight of considerations of sin and sanctity, of charity, or of divine revelation, wherein these take on their meaning. For here, too, is an area of truth; to such truth as this, as to any truth, man in virtue of his rational nature is open and can find himself obliged.

No one who would assess the intrinsic virtualities of Thomism or appreciate its present stature can ignore this book. The author, writing readably and in fine control of her materials, distills into remarkably brief compass the Thomistic and Christian genius of one of the greats in contemporary philosophy.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

The All-Present God. A Study in St. Augustine. **By Stanislaus J. Grabowski. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954. Pp. 327. $4.50.**

It is strange that American studies of the philosophy, biography and literary production of St. Augustine far outnumber the books and articles devoted to his religious thought. We need to be reminded, as we are forcefully by this splendid book, that Augustine centered his life of thought and action on God. Because of this theocentric theme, Father Grabowski is able to give an exposition of the whole of Augustinism. All things in the world of St. Augustine are dependent on God quite immediately; His divine power is intimately present to all, from highest to lowest. That is why the approach used in this book is probably the best that could be selected for a synoptic view of Augustine's thought.

Though the emphasis throughout is religious and the appeal primarily to those interested in theology, the book shows a lively interest in the historical backgrounds and philosophical implications of Augustinism. The great Christian teachers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries often considered one question near the beginning of their theological writings: whether theology is a demonstrative science or a form of wisdom. For St. Augustine, there is no doubt that it is a wisdom. Today, when theology has come to mean so much and so little, it is indeed valuable to have a thorough explanation of what is best in the Patristic tradition on the theme of God and creation. Chapter IV (*Modes of Presence*) is a masterful discussion of the notion of divine presence, in the light of what is meant by physical and spiritual presence. Not only theologians but also students of metaphysics may learn much from this chapter. The same can be said about later chapters on dualism and pantheism in relation to Augustine's teaching.

Father Grabowski's book is also very well documented. One would expect adequate references to Augustine's own works. But the footnotes also display a wide erudition in the Greek philosophical sources, in the other Fathers of the Church, in mediaeval literature. More than that, the citations of modern secondary studies are most complete. Besides the usual languages of Augustinian scholarship, Father Grabowski is able to use the quite extensive Polish literature. Both general readers and advanced students will find this book a rich source of information, bibliographically and doctrinally.

MICHAEL M. MONTAGUE, S.J., *St. Stanislaus*

Raison philosophique et religion revelée. **By André Marc, S.J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954. Pp. 292.**

This book is a collection of various articles by Father Marc, which appeared in European theological and philosophical journals between 1939 and 1954. The unity of the work, though hardly tight, becomes less obscure if the book is viewed in continuity with Father Marc's earlier writings. Having explored human consciousness to construct a metaphysical anthropology in his *Psychologie Réflexive*, Father Marc set man in his context within the real by showing the intellectual and volitional relationships of the human existent to transcendental being in a further work, *Dialectique de l'Affirmation*. The consequences of this unity of the finite and the infinite within the real were applied to questions concerning the nature and drive of human activity in the *Dialectique de l'Agir*. Man is situated, not only in a world which he desires to understand and control, but also before a God whom he desires to see. This latter possibility becomes a real possibility only if God first intervenes to communicate with man. The basic assertion of Christianity is that such a free intervention has been revealed as a fact. If revelation answers many problems, it raises many more. The relations between supernatural revelation and human reason and the fulfillment of the desires of human reason by revelation set the framework for this present work. Father Marc's procedure of allowing philosophy to ask the questions and posit the problems to which revelation gives the answers and solutions reminds us of Prof. Tillich's "method of correlation."

Taking his cue from Brunschvicg, Father Marc centres the first two essays, which give the title to the book, around the notion of *word*. As in human communication, the external word of discourse, though temporal and material, is a revealing sign, leading to a knowledge of the atemporal and spiritual word of thought, so in Divine Revelation, the Word of God, by becoming historically incarnate in a human nature, leads to a share in the transcendent life of God. Christ is God's revelation to man, and Christianity is not only faith in Christ's teaching, but faithfulness to His person. In Christ are overcome the dichotomies of infinite and finite, nature and the supernatural, the historical and the transcendent.

It is in terms of Christ that the answer is to be found to such contemporary problems as the meaning of heroic existence, assurance and risk, and the meaning of history. These are treated in the subsequent essays.

Though this little work is not of the same stature as some of Father Marc's earlier writings, it does contain insights representative of the author's penetrating and energetic mind.

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Student Life in Ave Maria College, Mediaeval Paris. **By A. L. Gabriel. "Publications in Mediaeval Studies, XIV." Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1955. Pp. xviii + 460. $6.75.**

This scholarly and timely monograph by Father Gabriel is divided, like Gaul, into three parts, although the divisions are not of equal length. The first part of the book (pp. 1-30) treats extensively of the various manuscripts which the author has consulted in order to produce the book and his discussion is a model of clarity and completeness. The second part of the volume consists of various chapters on the college life at Ave Maria and treats of the life and intentions of the founders, the growth and location of the college building, the college students, the administration of the college, and the statutes. All of these chapters are based upon a careful use of the manuscript sources. There is an important chapter on the devotional life of the students with special reference to the manuscript miniatures in the Chartulary which well illustrate various aspects and are reproduced in this volume. The author has summarized his main conclusions at the end of this section (pp. 243-47). The third section, an extremely valuable one, is the complete reproduction of the *Chartularium* of the college preceded by a brief discussion of the editing principles which the writer followed. There is an extensive bibliography comprising some three hundred items and an index of some twenty pages.

In a work of this nature, even after careful combing of the materials, the amount of factual data discovered is sometimes rather small for some items; but the researcher cannot do more than find what is there. For this reason, the chapters are sometimes rather brief, but the author has limited himself strictly to the Ave Maria College and its source materials. He has emphasized the devotional life of the students and this is important, for too many sections of the relatively few books and articles that deal with medieval university life so stress the scandalous that they remind one more of gossip than scholarship. That there were serious evils in medieval university life is not to be denied; that they were as flagrant as those on many modern university campuses can seriously be doubted. At any rate, there *was* a religious side to medieval university life, and Father Gabriel has done all historians of education a service in making clear this aspect.

The other chapters bring out the economic, intellectual, and recreational side of student life. The collection of the statutes of the college is especially helpful to gain a general picture of a medieval college since they go into detail as regards the quantity of food and drink, the type of dress and

recreation, etc., and the supervised study of these Ave Maria students who ranged in age from eight to sixteen.

The inclusion of the College Chartulary (pp. 251-420) was an excellent idea because it makes the book not merely an important monograph on its subject, but the book itself becomes a primary source for further consultation and exploitation. It is to be hoped that this volume will be but one of many of this type of educational treatise by means of which the full and accurate story of medieval college life can at long last be told.

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